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Most state court judges in the United States stand for election, whetherit be one in which an opposing candidate can run or one in whichan appointed judge stands for retention.  Accordingly, questions
concerning what judicial candidates can say during an election campaign are of
great significance.  At the end of its past term, the United States Supreme Court
issued its first decision regarding the tension between the First Amendment
and restrictions that have been placed by states on the speech of judicial can-
didates.
We asked two leading experts on judicial campaigns to write in response
to that decision, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.  We are extremely
pleased that they agreed to write for us in
response to this decision and we think you’ll
find their views of interest.  Both authors—
Georgetown University law professor Roy
Schotland and Washington lawyer Jan Baran—
wrote Supreme Court amicus briefs in White,
Schotland for the Conference of Chief Justices
and Baran for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
(For additional background on judicial cam-
paign conduct and the First Amendment, see
the Indiana Law Review, Volume 35, No. 3
(2002), which contains a series of papers pre-
sented at the National Symposium on Judicial
Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment, held in November 2001 before
the White case was accepted by the Supreme Court.)
In addition to this review of the White decision and its legal impact, David
Rottman presents the results of an opinion survey of both judges and the gen-
eral public regarding judicial campaign issues.  While the public and the
judges agree on many things, there are also some intriguing differences.
The issue also includes:
• Professor Charles Whitebread’s annual review of all of the signif-
icant cases of the past term of the U.S. Supreme Court;
• A report from the CCJ-COSCA Problem-Solving Courts
Committee, authored by Utah court administrator Daniel Becker
and Michigan Chief Justice Maura Corrigan; and 
• Another effort by legal writing professor Joseph Kimble, a prior
Court Review contributor, to keep the key concepts of good writ-
ing in our minds, this time reviewing the drafting of the USA
Patriot Act.
As you read the issue, keep in mind that we're happy to print letters to the
editor or other contributions from readers. —SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
43 of this issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit,
condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit:  cover photo, Mary Watkins. The cover
photo is of the Old Cape May Courthouse in Cape May,
New Jersey.  It is listed on the National Register of
Historic Places.
© 2002, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
P.O. Box 8798, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798.
Points of view or opinions expressed in Court Review are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
positions of the National Center for State Courts or the
American Judges Association.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
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In my previous column, I asked a simple question: If we
would agree that the lawyer who represents himself has a fool
for a client, then why are we spending so much time and
money trying to assist non-law-trained pro se litigants in rep-
resenting themselves in court?  If we would agree that, gener-
ally speaking, justice is best served by access to quality legal
representation, then why not focus our efforts on achieving
that?   Instead of trying to figure out how to make the court-
house more easily maneuverable to pro se litigants, perhaps we
should concentrate on making attorneys accessible and afford-
able to all persons who seek justice.  
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility states that “the
basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable
to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer.”
What can lawyers and judges do to live up to our
responsibility to make legal representation accessi-
ble and affordable?  What’s being done now?
At least one law firm, Vinson & Elkins, an inter-
national law firm with headquarters in Texas, is try-
ing to answer that challenge.  At Vinson & Elkins,
every hour an attorney spends working on a pro
bono case is recorded and treated as though that
time were reported, billed, and collected at the
standard hourly rate.  There are no asterisks, no dif-
ferentiation between hours recorded for paying clients and
those recorded for pro bono clients when it comes to an attor-
ney getting credit for work performed at the firm.  With this
approach, attorneys can provide pro bono assistance when
needed without having to be concerned with the appearance of
decreased productivity or longer work hours to make up for the
lost time spent on pro bono matters.  Rather than being penal-
ized for pro bono efforts, pro bono hours and community
involvement are actually included in the factors to be consid-
ered in evaluation and compensation decisions at the law firm.
Does it work?  According to the law firm, in 2000, Vinson
& Elkins lawyers provided more than 33,116 hours (an average
of about 50 hours per lawyer) of free legal services.  These ser-
vices ranged from cases as serious as habeas appeals, death
penalty litigation, political asylum, and civil rights cases to
matters involving family, juvenile, criminal, elder, mental
health, tax, and environmental law, as well as Social Security,
pension benefits, and landlord/tenant disputes.  
If every lawyer and every law firm in every state in the
United States would take a lesson from Vinson & Elkins and
step up to the challenge of providing quality and affordable pro
bono representation, millions of hours of free legal representa-
tion would be available to those in need.  This kind of pro bono
effort would go a long way toward achieving the goal of access
to justice for all persons.
Several states have also taken up the challenge.  Many states
include a voluntary contribution to pro bono legal services in
their billing for bar dues and license renewals.  Most states
leave it up to the individual lawyer to add a suggested amount
to their payment, but at least two states, Texas and South
Carolina, factor a contribution amount into the total bill,
requiring lawyers to “opt-out” of contributing if they do not
desire to do so.  As a general rule, the “opt-out” approach
results in more contributions than those allowing an “opt-in.”
Either way, all across our nation, attorneys are voluntarily con-
tributing millions of dollars to pro bono efforts.  Yet, it appears
that less than 50% of the lawyers in the nation chose to volun-
tarily participate in this way.
What can judges do?  Obviously, the ethical constraints of
most states would prevent judges from offering traditional pro
bono legal services.  However, that doesn’t mean
that judges can’t contribute.  First, judges, as leaders
in the legal community, should encourage pro bono
representation at every turn.  Judges should speak
out about the need for attorneys to provide pro
bono legal services in order to achieve a fair and
accessible justice system for all.
Second, judges should seriously consider select-
ing a pro bono organization or effort and designat-
ing it as their number-one priority for charitable
giving.  Because medical and health issues affect
everyone from every walk of life, there will always be broad
support for health-related charities.  Americans can always be
counted on to contribute to disaster relief.  And as long as there
are graduates, schools across this country will be able to count
on alumni support.  
The support base for pro bono organizations, however, is
much more narrow.  Public support is virtually nonexistent,
which is understandable, since few persons outside the justice
system can appreciate firsthand the need for legal representa-
tion.  Not everyone comprehends how vital it is that our court
systems provide access to justice, which includes affordable
legal representation.  But judges do.
So, it’s not surprising that, aside from government subsidies,
virtually the only funding sources for pro bono charities are
judges and lawyers.  If we are one of only a few who understand
the need to contribute to these efforts, then we need to give
more.  That’s why we, as judges, should focus our charitable
contributions on pro bono charities.  Give a little to health
issues, disaster relief, alma maters, and other worthy causes,
but give most where others will not, because if we won’t, no
one else will.
If we do our part to speak out whenever possible on the
need for accessible and affordable legal representation and to
dig deeply into our pockets and contribute toward this worthy
effort, then the vision of our forefathers of assistance of coun-
sel in our justice system will be realized.  And in doing so, we
will take a giant step forward in providing justice for all.
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President’s Column
Bonnie Sudderth
Five years ago the term “problem-solving courts” was not commonlyused or understood in the court
community.  Today, however, the term
describes over a thousand courts around
the country.  Problem-solving courts gen-
erally focus on the underlying chronic
behaviors of criminal defendants.  Acting
on the input of a team of experts from the
community, a problem-solving court
judge orders the defendant to comply
with an individualized plan and then the
judge (with the assistance of the commu-
nity team) exercises intensive supervision
over the defendant to ensure compliance
with the terms of the plan.  Individual-
ized plans may include participating in a
treatment program, submitting to peri-
odic substance abuse screenings, and pro-
viding restitution. If the defendant suc-
cessfully complies with the terms of the
individualized plan, criminal charges are
favorably resolved either by dismissal of
charges, reduction of sentence, or the
imposition of some lesser penalty.
Examples of problem-solving courts in
operation in the United States include
drug courts, mental health courts,
domestic violence courts, homeless
courts, teen courts, tobacco courts, and
some forms of family courts. 
ORIGIN OF PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS
Problem-solving courts originated
with the drug court movement.  After
judges and other community leaders first
learned about the anecdotal successes of
drug courts, they applied the same tech-
niques to other types of cases, including
mental health, domestic violence, and
gun violence.  
The movement began and flourished
at the local level in trial courts.  The
speed and acceptance of the problem-
solving courts movement surprised many
court observers.  The speed and accep-
tance of these courts was fueled, in large
part, by the availability of federal dollars
to plan and implement these courts and
the large number of anecdotal success
stories across the nation.  
ROLE OF STATE COURT LEADERS
State court leaders were initially skep-
tical about the long-term viability of these
courts and concerned about their impact
on unified court systems.  In 1999, how-
ever, it was obvious that problem-solving
courts had been proliferating both in
numbers and in types of cases handled.
Recognizing this, the Conference of State
Court Administrators (COSCA) devel-
oped a white paper to present to their
membership in August 1999.  The white
paper hypothesized that state court lead-
ers were “playing catch up” with this
movement that had developed and flour-
ished under the direction of local court
judges.  The white paper established a
framework for state court leaders to dis-
cuss their appropriate role in the admin-
istration and expansion of problem-solv-
ing courts.  The consensus was that the
Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and
COSCA should assume a leadership role
in providing direction and the appropri-
ate court-based focus for these courts.  
CCJ and COSCA jointly appointed a
Task Force on Therapeutic Justice in
August 1999 and charged them with
developing specific recommendations
and an action plan for the two confer-
ences.  The task force presented their rec-
ommendations to the two conferences in
August 2000 in the form of a resolution.
The resolution clearly identified an
agenda for the two conferences.  The
main points of the resolution were:
(1) Call these new courts and calen-
dars “problem-solving courts,”
recognizing that courts have
always been involved in attempt-
ing to resolve disputes and prob-
lems in society, but understanding
that the collaborative nature of
these new efforts deserves recog-
nition. 
(2) Take steps, nationally and locally,
to expand and better integrate the
principles and methods of well-
functioning drug courts into
ongoing court operations.
(3) Advance the careful study and
evaluation of the principles and
methods employed in problem-
solving courts and their applica-
tion to other significant issues fac-
ing state courts.
(4) Encourage, where appropriate, the
broad integration over the next
decade of the principles and meth-
ods employed in the problem-solv-
ing courts into the administration
of justice to improve court
processes and outcomes while pre-
serving the rule of law, enhancing
judicial effectiveness, and meeting
the needs and expectations of liti-
gants, victims, and the community.
(5) Support national and local educa-
tion and training regarding the
principles and methods employed
in problem-solving courts and col-
laboration with other community
and government agencies and
organizations.
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(6) Advocate for the resources neces-
sary to advance and apply the
principles and methods of prob-
lem-solving courts in the general
court systems of the various states. 
(7) Establish a national agenda consis-
tent with the resolution.
The most significant aspect of the reso-
lution was the vision and challenge con-
tained in its fourth point—to encourage,
where appropriate, the broad integration
over the next decade of the principles and
methods employed in the problem-solving
courts into the administration of justice.
This aspect is significant because it articu-
lated a proactive vision and goal for the
future on the part of both organizations
and it encompassed a statement of respon-
sibility on the part of both conferences for
realizing that vision.  The task force was
renamed the Problem-Solving Courts
Committee and continued for the purpose
of overseeing the implementation of the
resolution and realization of the vision.  
Evaluating the various approaches
taken in designing and implementing
problem-solving courts is an integral part
of ensuring the integration of their princi-
ples and methods into the administration
of justice.  Although, for example, every
state either has a drug court or is planning
a drug court,1 few jurisdictions have uti-
lized the same approach in the design and
implementation of those courts.  As of
June 2001, 38 states had enacted or intro-
duced legislation regarding the planning,
operating, or funding of drug courts,
including three states that allocated
tobacco settlement funds for drug courts.2
Ten states had enacted court rules regard-
ing drug courts.3 The various approaches
allow experimentation, which in turn
allows the evaluation of the effectiveness
of various models of implementation and
the unique challenges each model raises. 
THREE APPROACHES TO THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
This section explores three different
approaches to the institutionalization of
problem-solving courts: local court-initi-
ated implementation, statewide imple-
mentation, and higher court-led imple-
mentation.  These approaches are illus-
trated through a discussion of the imple-
mentation of problem-solving courts in
three states: Michigan, Idaho, and New
York. We will briefly describe each of
these problem-solving courts and the
steps taken to integrate these courts into
the judicial system. The experience of
these courts is instructive and points the
way to further innovation. 
A. Michigan: Local Court-Initiated
Implementation
Problem-solving courts, especially drug
courts, have proliferated in Michigan.4
Originally, these drug courts were initiated
and implemented by the local district
courts, with minimal guidance or direction
from state court leaders or the legislature.
In addition, some district courts—the
rough equivalent, in other states, of munic-
ipal courts—started problem-solving
courts to deal with other issues, including
domestic violence courts and family drug
courts, aimed at combating parents’ drug
problems that threatened their children’s
health and safety.  Michigan’s problem-
solving courts have developed rules and
procedures well suited for local problems,
because the state allows district courts
some latitude to address local issues and
budget priorities.  That same flexibility,
however, raises some concerns.  In extend-
ing the scope of problem-solving courts,
district courts may inadvertently develop
rules that create due process and separa-
tion of powers problems.
The potential for serious problems
stems, in part, from the lack of explicit
statutory authority for problem-solving
courts.  The state legislature has not yet
addressed this issue.  The judiciary bud-
get, which provides funding for problem-
solving courts, states that problem-solv-
ing courts are responsible for “. . . han-
dling cases involving substance-abusing
nonviolent offenders through comprehen-
sive supervision, testing, treatment, ser-
vices, immediate sanctions, and incen-
tives.”5 The legislature apparently
believes that problem-solving courts are
important, but it has not yet set up a
structural framework to ensure that con-
stitutional rights are protected and that
each court follows similar sentencing and
operational guidelines.  The State Court
Administrative Office, which administers
grant programs for problem-solving
courts, and the federal government both
require the courts to meet 10 key criteria
for funding.  Although these guidelines
describe a minimum level of services,
they do not provide the sentencing and
other safeguards that an institutional
change of this magnitude requires.  In cre-
ating committees to design and imple-
ment problem-solving courts, many dis-
trict courts appointed respected defense
attorneys to protect defendants’ due
process rights.6 Attorney participation in
local experiments, however, will not guar-
antee a properly structured court system.  
The judges who sit on Michigan’s prob-
lem-solving courts are among the best in
the state.  But even the best judges bene-
fit from a clear statutory or rule-based
framework from which to operate their
courts.  Proponents of problem-solving
courts believe that flexibility is crucial to
their effectiveness.  The current challenge
facing Michigan’s problem-solving courts
is to provide a basic framework while pre-
serving flexibility.
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1. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Communities
Nationwide to Receive Federal Funds for Drug Courts (June 6,
2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/dcpo/publications.
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2. OJP DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
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4. See L.L. Braiser, Addicts Turn to Court for Help; Program Strives for
Participants’ Recovery, No Jail, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 22, 2002,
at 1B.
5. H.R. 5648, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2002), available at
http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/AboutCourt/Budget.
htm.
6. Heather H. Wilson, Sobriety Courts Are Gaining Momentum in
Michigan, MICH. LAW. WKLY., May 20, 2002, at 16.
B. Idaho: Statewide Implementation
In Idaho, all three branches of state
government worked together to design,
implement, and oversee problem-solving
courts.   Indeed, the chief justice, gover-
nor, and legislature have embarked on a
joint venture to ensure that every county
has a drug court.  Governor Dirk
Kempthorne has made it a priority in a
tight budget year to fully fund state drug
courts, despite a substantial decrease in
federal grants for the programs.7 Idaho’s
judicial leadership has been deeply
involved in the development of these
courts.  Chief Justice Linda Trout, in her
address to the state legislature, spoke of
her desire to extend the benefits of drug
courts to every county.8
Despite this push for drug courts from
the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches, local courts have maintained
their flexibility.  First District Court Judge
James Michaud has tailored his program
to the particular drugs that plague his
jurisdiction.9 He believes that successful
drug courts all share certain characteris-
tics, but retain the flexibility to respond
to local problems.10 “It’s a regional thing,”
according to Judge Michaud:  local laws
and problems call for a variety of treat-
ment and enforcement options.11 It
appears that Idaho has worked diligently
to strike the right balance between flexi-
bility for local communities and judicial,
legislative, and executive involvement
from the top down.
At the same time, Idaho’s experience
highlights a problem faced by every state:
a tight budget year.  While the legislature
has increased funding for the drug court
system, it has given relatively smaller
increases to the rest of the judiciary, and
is cutting funding in some areas.  The
executive branch and the judiciary are
pushing to expand drug courts to all
counties, but a budget shortfall may arise
elsewhere.  If drug courts are effective in
the long term, they can save the taxpayers
money. At the same time, problem-solv-
ing courts should not be funded at the
expense of the rest of the justice system.
C. New York: Higher Court-Led
Implementation
Under the leadership of Chief Judge
Judith S. Kaye and Chief Administrative
Judge Jonathan Lippman, New York has
been a national leader in adopting a prob-
lem-solving model of jurisprudence.
New York is home to dozens of drug
courts, community courts, domestic vio-
lence courts, and other problem-solving
experiments.  These include the nation’s
first community court, opened in 1993 in
the Times Square neighborhood of
Manhattan; the first multi-jurisdictional
community court, hearing civil, criminal,
and family court cases in the same court-
room; one of the largest drug treatment
courts in the country in Brooklyn; and
several new experiments known as “inte-
grated domestic violence courts,” in
which a single judge hears civil, criminal,
and matrimonial matters involving a sin-
gle family.
Based on the independently docu-
mented results of New York’s first genera-
tion of problem-solving experiments, the
state court system has embarked on per-
haps the most ambitious effort in the
country to “go to scale” with problem-
solving. In October 2000, Judge Kaye and
Judge Lippman launched a statewide ini-
tiative that seeks to forever change the
way that courts handle cases involving
addicted offenders.  The goal is to make
the drug court approach—links to drug
treatment, rigorous judicial monitoring,
graduated sanctions and rewards—stan-
dard operating practice in the courts.  As
a first step to achieving this goal, the
court system will create at least one drug
court in each of New York’s 62 counties
by 2003. A year into the effort, the num-
ber of drug treatment courts operating in
New York had gone up 39%, to 43; an
additional 50 are in the planning stages.
In addition to promoting drug court
replication, the state court system is
investing in an infrastructure to support a
new system-wide approach to drugs, cre-
ating statewide trainings for practition-
ers, a state-of-the-art technology applica-
tion, and an evaluation plan to track
results.
In addition to the statewide drug
reform effort, New York has embarked on
a series of other initiatives designed to
embed problem-solving within the judi-
cial culture of the state:
• Integrated Domestic Violence Courts:
There are currently six integrated
domestic violence courts in operation
or in the planning stages in New York.
These courts address a fundamental
concern expressed by court users—the
difficulty of navigating the jurisdic-
tional boundaries of the court system,
which frequently require the same
family to appear in front of multiple
decision makers in multiple locations.
While these experiments are still new,
they have already generated significant
enthusiasm among users for streamlin-
ing court processes.  Accordingly, the
court system is currently exploring
“going to scale” with this model, in
much the same way it has sought to
institutionalize a new approach to
drug cases. 
• Additional Experiments: The court sys-
tem’s research and development arm,
the Center for Court Innovation, has
been charged with testing additional
adaptations of the problem-solving
model (demonstration projects cur-
rently in the works include a mental
health court, a juvenile intervention
court, and a parole reentry court).  
These efforts represent a multifaceted
institutional effort to move problem-solv-
ing justice from the margins to the main-
stream of court operations. 
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CONCLUSION
Overall, our “report card” shows
promising results as these three states
develop long-term plans to integrate
problem-solving courts into their estab-
lished judicial systems.  Experimentation
throughout the states will allow jurisdic-
tions to evaluate the effectiveness of vari-
ous implementation approaches and
models.  Although the results are promis-
ing, the unique challenges posed by prob-
lem-solving courts still need to be
addressed:
• What makes a problem-solving court
effective?
• How can problem-solving courts set
standards to protect constitutional
rights?
• How can these courts be funded, with-
out depriving traditional courts?  
• What degree of specialization is neces-
sary and when does specialization
become harmful and make courts
unnecessarily complex?
The CCJ and COSCA Problem-Solving
Courts Committee will continue to
address these and other related issues so
that the vision of “broad integration of
the principles and methods of problem-
solving courts” is realized.
Daniel J. Becker has been
the top administrator for
the Utah state court sys-
tem since 1995.  Before
that, he was deputy
director of the North
Carolina Administrative
Office of the Courts and
held other court administration positions in
North Carolina and Georgia.  Becker is a
member of the board of directors of the
National Center for State Courts and
received a distinguished service award from
the National Center in 2001.  He also is vice
president and a member of the board of
directors of the Conference of State Court
Administrators.  Becker received his bache-
lor’s degree in political science in 1974 and
his master’s of public administration in
1976 from Florida Atlantic University.
Maura D. Corrigan was
elected to the Michigan
Supreme Court in 1998
for an eight-year term.
She was elected chief jus-
tice in 2001.  In practice,
she was an assistant
prosecuting attorney in
Wayne County, Michigan from 1974 to
1979; in 1979, she became chief of appeals
in the United States Attorney’s Office in
Detroit; in 1986, she became the first
woman to be Chief Assistant United States
Attorney in Detroit; and in 1989, she
entered private practice as a partner in the
firm of Plunkett & Cooney.  She was
appointed to the Michigan Court of Appeals
in 1992 and became its chief judge in 1997.
Corrigan graduated magna cum laude from
Marygrove College in Detroit in 1969 and
cum laude from the University of Detroit
Law School in 1973.
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2003 MIDYEAR MEETING
Billings, Montana
May 15-17
Sheraton Billings Hotel
($65.00 single or double -
run of house;
$75.00 single or double -
executive king)
2003 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
Montreal, Quebec
September 14-19
Hotel Omni Mont-Royal
$220.00 single or double – 
Canadian
(currently about $138 US)
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
Judges sometimes are unrealistic.  Whatever one’s view ofthe recent Pledge of Allegiance decision, do you rememberClinton v. Jones,1 in which eight justices had no doubt that
there were no serious risks in allowing Paula Jones’ lawsuit to
proceed against a sitting President?2
The Supreme Court’s decision about judicial elections3 shows
how unrealistic five justices can be about what happens in elec-
tion campaigns, and also—ironically—about how much judges
differ from legislators and others who run for office.  Reality was
captured concisely by Robert Hirshon, president of the
American Bar Association, who said,”This is a bad decision.  It
will open a Pandora’s Box . . . .”4 The decision will make a
change in judicial election campaigns that will downgrade the
pool of candidates for the bench, reduce the willingness of good
judges to seek reelection, add to the cynical view that judges are
merely “another group of politicians,” and thus directly hurt
state courts and indirectly hurt all our courts.
After noting the majority and separate opinions (which,
unsurprisingly, open many questions), I predict what litigation
lies ahead, then describe the judicial election scene and
prospects for reform, and last, suggestions to candidates and all
judges.  The decision is not reducible to the simplistic, mis-
leading proposition that “[n]otwithstanding ABA policy to the
contrary, the law of the land now holds that the First
Amendment trumps all other considerations when it comes to
judicial elections.”5
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that Minnesota could
not prohibit a candidate for judicial office from “announc[ing]
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”6
Although that “announce clause” has been law in only nine
states, the decision will impact all but one of the 39 states in
which at least some judges face some type of elections, because
all states have canons limiting what candidates may say in cam-
paigns.7 Another limitation, as Justice Scalia wrote, bars judi-
cial candidates from making “pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office,”—a prohibition that, as he wrote, “is not
challenged here and on which we express no view.”8 As for a
third limitation, “[t]he Court’s treatment of the [‘commit
clause’] precluding a candidate from making ‘statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court’ was, unfortunately, not a model of clarity.”9
Justice Stevens, writing for four dissenters, said this:   
By obscuring the fundamental distinction between
campaigns for the judiciary and the political branches,
Footnotes 
1. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
2. As the Court put it in reversing the lower court’s stay order, “We
think the District Court may have given undue weight to the con-
cern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could
conceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his
office. If and when that should occur, the court’s discretion would
permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including
deferral of trial) that interference with the President’s duties
would not occur. But no such impingement upon the President’s
conduct of his office was shown here.”  Id. at 708. 
3. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
4. David G. Savage, Running Stance, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 32.
5. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Chair’s Column, JUDICIAL DIV. RECORD
(ABA), Summer 2002, at 2.
6. 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
7. Id.  at 2541, n. 13.  Justice Scalia erred in excluding Idaho, which
at the end of 2001 adopted the “pledge or promise” clause.
Jan Baran overstates, and at once corrects his overstatement,
that  “[c]andidates cannot be gagged by Canon 5.”  Jan Witold
Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 12. Two sen-
tences later, he rightly notes that only “the version of Canon 5
used by the Minnesota courts” was at issue here, and only one
part of Minnesota’s canon.  Id.
Baran misstates how Minnesota had treated the “announce
clause.”  He says that “the clause can be read—and was read by
the Minnesota disciplinary committee—to prohibit virtually any
commentary about legal or political issues.”  But Justice Scalia
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wrote this:
The Lawyers Board dismissed the complaint [against
plaintiff Wersal]; with regard to the charges that his cam-
paign materials violated the announce clause, it expressed
doubt whether the clause could constitutionally be
enforced. Nonetheless, fearing that further ethical com-
plaints would jeopardize his ability to practice law, Wersal
withdrew from the election. In 1998, Wersal ran again for
the same office. Early in that race, he sought an advisory
opinion from the Lawyers Board with regard to whether it
planned to enforce the announce clause. The Lawyers Board
responded equivocally, stating that, although it had signifi-
cant doubts about the constitutionality of the provision, it
was unable to answer his question because he had not sub-
mitted a list of the announcements he wished to make.
122 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
And as Justice Stevens noted, “no candidate has yet been sanc-
tioned for violating the announce clause.”  Id. at 2547, n.2
(emphasis added).   In fact, we cannot find any case in any state
(in the last decade or so) involving a finding of violation of the
“announce clause,” except for J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953
(Ky. 1991), in which the clause was held unconstitutional.  For
that fact, I am indebted to Cynthia Gray of the American
Judicature Society, an outstanding authority on the canons.
But put aside Baran’s tiny errors.  Never has anyone so well
captured the whole matter as he does, saying: “[J]udges must
judge.  They cannot prejudge.”  Baran, supra, at 13.
8. 122 S. Ct. at 2532.
9. National Center for State Courts, Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial
Should Judges Be 
More Like Politicians? 
Roy A. Schotland
and by failing to recognize the difference between state-
ments made in articles or opinions and those made on
the campaign trail, the Court defies any sensible notion
of the judicial office and the importance of impartiality
in that context.10
Arguably the most significant point about the majority opin-
ion is that, whether or not they “obscur[ed]” the distinction
between judicial and nonjudicial elections, they did not ignore
it.  They did not adopt what Justice Ginsberg (also writing for
four dissenters) called “the unilocular, ‘an election is an elec-
tion,’ approach.”11 As an example of that approach, she quoted
the dissenting judge below: “When a state opts to hold an elec-
tion, it must commit itself to a complete election, replete with
free speech and association.”12
The majority’s reply reveals that one or more justices are
unwilling or at least unready to strike more (or much more)
regulation of judicial campaigns:
Justice Ginsburg [attacks] arguments we do not
make. [W]e neither assert nor imply  that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to
sound the same as those for legislative office.13
Of course, one cannot say how many of the five majority jus-
tices would strike how much more of the canons, but it is hard
to see why their opinion would have included any such limita-
tion if all five agreed with what Justice Kennedy said alone.
Justice Kennedy, joining the majority but also writing alone,
views judicial elections as like (or not materially different
from) nonjudicial elections, and so he would strike all limits on
candidate speech.  But he made two important points about
what can be done to meet injudicious conduct in judicial cam-
paigns.  First, he said that states “may adopt recusal standards
more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges
who violate these standards.”14 In the most significant step
since White—a step rich with promise for the overwhelming
majority of candidates who want to campaign judiciously—the
Missouri Supreme Court has taken up the justice’s invitation, as
noted below.  Second, Kennedy also encouraged what is often
called “more speech to meet speech”:  
The legal profession, the legal academy, the press,
voluntary groups, political and civic leaders, and all
interested citizens can use their own First Amendment
Freedoms to protest statements inconsistent with stan-
dards of judicial neutrality and judicial excellence.
Indeed, if democracy is to fulfill its promise, they must
do so.15
Justice Stevens made the same
point, adding that even official
bodies like the defendant board
in this case “may surely advise
the electorate that such
announcements demonstrate the
speaker’s unfitness for judicial
office.  If the solution to harmful
speech must be more speech, so
be it.”16
Justice O’Connor, who also
joined the majority and wrote
alone, took a familiar and simple
approach: we shouldn’t have
judicial elections, because of the
fundamental tension between
judicial independence and elec-
tions.  But she ignored reality: the
difficulty of ending judicial elections.  For example, Florida’s
voters in 2000 (“Yes, Virginia, there were other things on the
ballot!”) overwhelmingly rejected changing from contestable
elections for their trial judges to the same system of merit-
appointment and “retention” elections that they have for their
appellate judges (with voters deciding only whether a sitting
judge continues or not).  The opposition to the change was led
by all the women’s and minorities’ bar associations; similarly in
1987, Ohio voters overwhelmingly agreed with the opposition’s
key advertisement against change: “Don’t let them take away
your vote!”17
The surest result of the White decision is (for a change)
more litigation, of three types.  First, there will be two kinds of
lawsuits about the surviving provisions that regulate judicial
campaign speech, the “commit clause” and the “pledge or
promise Clause.”  There will be attacks on the facial constitu-
tionality of each clause, and there will be disputes about
whether this or that particular statement violated one or both
of those clauses.  Second, there will be litigation over whether
the 17 states that have chosen nonpartisan elections for all or
some of their judges can preserve the nonpartisanship they
prefer.  Minnesota, like most or all these states, bans party
endorsements—indeed, the plaintiff who brought the White
case was joined by the Republican Party of Minnesota because
of that provision.  Their attack on it was rejected in the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court excluded that issue when it
granted certiorari—but now that we have White, surely courts
will be asked to revisit this issue.  In addition, the nonpartisan
states limit judicial candidates from announcing their own
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Election Law, July 12, 2002 memo analyzing the case (on file with
the author).
10. 122 S. Ct. at 2546.
11. 122 S. Ct. at 2550, 2551.
12. Id. at 2550-51 (quoting Judge Beam, dissenting, 247 F.3d 854,
885,  897 (8th Cir. 2001)).  Judge Reinhardt has also taken the
“unilocular” approach.  See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 286,
291-96 (9th Cir. 1990) (concurring opinion).  For other exam-
ples, see Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and
Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REV. 659, 663-65 (2002) (on “‘An
Election is an Election is an Election’: The mantra that passed for
analysis in the decisions limiting Canon provisions”).
13. 122 S. Ct. at 2539.
14. Id. at 2544, 2545.
15. Id. at 2545.
16. Id. at 2546.
17. For the Florida and and Ohio developments, see Roy A.
Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and
Challenge, 2001 M.S.U.-D.C.L. L. REV. 849, 886-90.
Arguably the
most significant
point about the
majority opinion
is that, whether
or not they
“obscur[ed]” the
distinction
between judicial
and nonjudicial
elections, they
did not ignore it. 
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party affiliation.18 Will that limitation stand up?  Last, all but
four of the 39 states bar judicial candidates from personally
soliciting campaign funds; most of these states also limit the
time period for fund-raising.19 Will these limitations survive?
One other prediction: White will figure, perhaps substan-
tially, in the next U.S. Senate confirmation hearing of any nom-
inee for a federal judgeship who holds back in answering sena-
tors’ questions.  Justice Ginsburg drew upon several of the
briefs for, as Justice Scalia put it, “repeated invocation of
instances in which nominees to this Court declined to
announce [views on disputed legal issues] during Senate con-
firmation hearings . . . .”20 Scalia answers that the majority “do
[not] assert that candidates for judicial office should be com-
pelled to announce their views . . . .”21 Stay posted!
Justice O’Connor’s call to change the current scene must be
realistic about the scene.   Of the nation’s 10,000 state judges
(appellate and general-jurisdiction trial), 87% face elections of
some type: 53% of appellate judges face contestable elections,
partisan or nonpartisan, and another 34% face retention elec-
tions.  Of our trial judges, 77% face contestable elections, only
10% face retention elections.  That’s after a century of major
effort by the bar and good-government groups for adoption of
the “merit” retention system.  At that rate of change, we need
160 years to end contestable elections for appellate judges and
770 years for trial judges.  “Judicial reform is not for the short-
winded,” as New Jersey’s great Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt
taught.  But true as it is that for the last generation legislators
and voters have rejected “merit” systems, perhaps we are enter-
ing a new era, perhaps recent changes in judicial elections will
increase voters’ willingness to change systems.  Meanwhile, don’t
we need to work at reducing the problematic aspects of judicial
elections?
Until 1978, judicial elections were as uneventful as “playing
checkers by mail.” That year in Los Angeles County, a number
of Jerry Brown-appointed trial judges were defeated.  Then in
the 1980s in Texas, campaign spending soared.  But the biggest
change occurred in 2000 when campaign spending set sharply
higher records in 10 of the 20 states with high-court elections;
nationally, high-court candidates raised 61%
more than ever before.  And outside groups
like the Chamber of Commerce spent about
$16 million in just the five liveliest states:
Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, and
Ohio.  The campaigning in 2000, “nastier and
noisier,” was more like nonjudicial campaigns
than ever before.22
The states that chose judicial elections did
not want them to be like other elections.
Elections seemed less problematic than
appointments, which seemed elitist or mere
political patronage or both.  But those states
accompanied judicial elections with constitu-
tional provisions unthinkable for other elec-
tive officials—like uniquely long terms. The
constitutions of the 39 states in which judges
face elections have an array of such provisions,
unique to the judiciary, to accommodate the
choice of popular selection with the constitu-
tional value of judicial independence.  In all
39 (except Nebraska), judges’ terms are longer
than those of any other elective official.  In 37
of these states, only judges are subject to both
impeachment and special disciplinary process.
In 33, only judges are required to have train-
ing or experience or both (with the minor
18. In Washington, a judge put out material that included this:
“Bearing in mind the nonpartisan position a judge must maintain
while on the bench, it may be useful for you to know that Judge
Kaiser’s family have been lifelong Democrats.  Indeed, Judge
Kaiser has doorbelled for Democrats in the past.”  Matter of
Kaiser, 111 Wash.2d 275, 278, 759 P.2d 392, 394 (1988) (censur-
ing the judge for that and other statements).
19. ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORT,
PART 2 (1998), at n. 73 and at 47-49.  The former limitation was
sustained in the lower courts here and not appealed.  247 F.3d
854, 883-84 (8th Cir. 2001).  The latter limitation was stricken in
Zeller v. The Florida Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518 (N.D. Fla. 1995),
severely criticized in the Report, n. 83.
20. 122 S. Ct. at 2539, n. 11.
21. Id. (emphasis in original)
22. See Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, supra note 17, which
was cited by Justice O’Connor for this point. 122 S. Ct. at 2541,
2542.  She also cited the important 1998 ABA Report (Part 2) of
the Task Force on Lawyers’ Political Contributions, which led to
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s 1999 amendments with
respect to campaign contributions.  For the earlier events, see
Report at 13-18.
SELECTION AND RETENTION SYSTEMS FOR STATE COURT JUDGES
APPELLATE COURTS
Total appellate judges: 1,243
Total that stand for some form of election: 1,084 (87%)
Total that stand for contestable election: 659 (53%)
INITIAL TERM SUBSEQUENT TERMS
Appointment: 582 (47%) Appointment: 133 (11%)
Partisan Election:  495 (40%) Partisan Election: 400 (32%)
Nonpartisan Election: 166 (13%) Nonpartisan Election: 166 (13%)
Retention Election: 518 (43%)
GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS
Total trial judges: 8,489
Total that stand for some form of election: 7,378 (87%)
Total that stand for contestable election: 6,650 (77%)
INITIAL TERM SUBSEQUENT TERMS
Appointment: 2,061 (24%) Appointment: 1,013 (12%)
Partisan Election:  3,669 (43%) Partisan Election: 2,360 (28%)
Nonpartisan Election: 2,759 (33%) Nonpartisan Election: 2,891 (35%)
Retention Election: 2,127 (25%)
exception that in ten of those, the attorney general is subject to
similar requirements).  In 23, only judges are subject to
mandatory age retirement.  In 21, only judicial nominations go
through nominating commissions; in six states, this applies
even to interim appointments.  Last, in 18 states, only judges
cannot run for a nonjudicial office without first resigning.23
The impact of elections on judicial independence is ampli-
fied because so many states have such short terms for judges.
Although terms are uniquely long in some states (e.g., 14 years
in New York, 12 in California), in 15 states even the high
courts have only six-year terms; in 25 states, trial judges have
six-year terms and in another nine states, only four years.24
Can one avoid being deeply troubled by what short terms may
mean for nonroutine cases at all levels, and at the trial level, for
example, for sentencing and rulings on bail?
Of appellate judges who face elections, 38.5% have terms of
10 to 15 years and another 60.6% have six-to-eight-year terms.
Of trial judges who face elections, 13% have terms of 10 to 15
years, and another 67.6% have six-to-eight-year terms.   This
pattern shows that the choice of elections, “while perhaps a
decision of questionable wisdom, does not signify the aban-
donment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary carrying out its
duties fairly and thoroughly.”25 The 39 states have recognized
that, far from fulfilling the historic purpose in allowing for the
popular election of judges, any effort to treat judicial elections
like others acutely undermines the judiciaries’ independent
role under their constitutions. These states’ balanced approach
to the proper structure for an elected judiciary embodies the
understanding that 
the word “representative” connotes one who is not
only elected by the people, but who also, at a mini-
mum, acts on behalf of the people. Judges do that in a
sense—but not in the ordinary sense. . . .  The judge
represents the Law—which often requires him to rule
against the People.26
Five justices have decided that judicial election campaigns
cannot be kept as different as the states want.  The Pandora’s
Box that ABA president Hirshon predicts, will be opened by
the small minority of judicial candidates who simply want to
win—but given the dynamics of campaigns, those few candi-
dates may fuel a race for media coverage and appeals to single-
issue groups.  
Keeping judicial elections judicious involves not only the
First Amendment, but also the due process rights of litigants to
open-minded judges.  Further, as judicial campaigns become
more like other campaigns, more judges will become more like
politicians—and more people will so view judges generally.
Do we want decisions on, say, the First Amendment (and other
constitutional protections) made by people who are more like
legislators . . . or different from legislators?  If judges are more
like legislators, won’t that threaten the legitimacy of having
courts review the constitutionality of actions by the political
branches?
Perhaps more states will end contestable judicial elections.
But meanwhile?  First, what should candidates do now?  Take
advantage of what the Missouri Supreme Court ordered in
response to White: After noting which of their provisions will
no longer be enforced and which remain in full force and
effect, they provided (to finish their less-than-two-page order)
as follows:
Recusal [which there includes disqualification], or
other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of
any judge in cases that involve an issue about which
the judge has announced his or her views as otherwise
may be appropriate under the Code of Judicial
Conduct.27
That is an inspired step.  It supports the overwhelming major-
ity of candidates who want to campaign judiciously—they’ll be
able to say, “I know what you’d like me to say, but if I go into
that then I’ll be unable to sit in just the cases you care about
most.”  In addition, it enables any candidate whose opponent
has stretched the envelope (with some variant of “I’ll hang
them all,” or “I believe that anyone convicted of child abuse
should receive the maximum sentence allowed by law,” or “I’m
a tenant, not a landlord”) to respond with, “My opponent has
told you what he thinks you want, but hasn’t told you that he
won’t be able to deliver, because he’ll be disqualified from the
cases you care about.”
The most important single step to meet the challenges
inherent in judicial elections was urged in May by Ohio Chief
Justice Thomas J. Moyer—lengthen judicial terms to eight or
10 years.  That single step will not only reduce the problems
inherent in judicial elections but also go far to enlarge and
enrich the pool of people willing to seek to serve as judges, and
to induce good judges to continue serving.  After all, improv-
ing the caliber of who serves as judges is the whole goal of all
judicial selection reform.
Roy A. Schotland is a professor of law at
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
and serves as a senior advisor to the National
Center for State Courts.  A graduate of Harvard
Law School, Schotland served as a law clerk to
Justice William Brennan.  He has taught elec-
tion law, administrative law, and constitutional
law.  Schotland was the reporter for the ABA’s
Task Force on Lawyers’ Political Contributions and helped lead
the 2001 Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment.  He coauthored an amicus brief in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White on behalf of the Conference of Chief
Justices.
23. See amicus brief submitted in White on behalf of the Conference
of Chief Justices, at 6-7.
24. See Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
149,154-55 (1998).
25. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991).  
26. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphases in original).  
27. In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B.(1)(c) (July 18, 2002).
More than half of Missouri’s trial judges run in partisan elections.
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Footnotes 
1. See chart on page 10 of this issue of COURT Review.  See also Roy
A. Schotland, Introduction: Personal Views, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1361, 1365 (2001).  
2. See Stephen Gillers, If Elected, I Promise [______]”  — What Should
Judicial Candidates Be Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 725
(2002).  
3. 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
4. Professor Schotland suggests that the Minnesota announce clause
was not broadly interpreted by the Minnesota disciplinary com-
mittee to prohibit commentary about legal or political issues.  Roy
A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, COURT
REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 8 n.7.  Schotland correctly quotes from
the majority opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent regarding the
history of the board’s treatment of plaintiff Wersal and the lack of
sanctions for violations of the clause, respectively.
Schotland does not mention, however, that the Court also
made this statement:  “There are, however, some limitations that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has placed upon the scope of the
announce clause that are not (to put it politely) immediately
apparent from the text.” 122 S. Ct. at 2532.  Indeed, the Court con-
cluded with respect to both the state court and lawyers board
actions that “these limitations upon the text of the announce
clause are not all that they appear to be.”  Id. at 2533.  The Court
noted that at oral argument Minnesota stated that it could sanction
The people want to elect judges.  Notwithstanding a typicalWashington lawyer’s view of the judiciary enshrined inArticle III of the Constitution, the citizens of 39 states
insist that judges should be subject to electoral accountability
and not be given lifetime appointments by the government
elites.  For that reason, 53% of state appellate judges must run
in contested elections for an initial term on the bench (out of
1,243 judges).  Likewise, 66% of state trial court judges (8,489)
must first run in contested elections.  Eight-seven percent of all
state appellate and trial judges face some type of election for
subsequent terms.1 This insistence on elections creates a ten-
sion that Professor Stephen Gillers calls the “on the one hand,
on the other hand” dilemma.2 On the one hand, we expect that
judges not make extrajudicial or prejudicial comments about
the law, particularly controversial legal principles, while on the
other hand voters want information in order to cast an informed
vote.  Likewise, there is a constitutional dilemma.  The due
process rights of litigants must be preserved, but the First
Amendment rights of candidates and their supporters must be
honored.  The Supreme Court of the United States in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,3 has weighed in in favor of First
Amendment rights.  Candidates cannot be gagged by Canon 5.
The Minnesota case brought the dilemmas into focus, but not
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in the best of circumstances.  First, the version of Canon 5 used
by the Minnesota courts was the broadest and most unreason-
able.  Minnesota used the 1972 version of the model code,
which has long been abandoned by the ABA.  The contested
clause prohibited any candidate for election to judicial office to
“announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues.”  The clause can be read—and was read by the
Minnesota disciplinary committee—to prohibit virtually any
commentary about legal or political issues.4 This resulted in
what Professor Gillers described as the “rule of silence.”  In
order to avoid any possible claim of a violation of Canon 5, a
candidate limited herself to discussing only safe topics such as
one’s credentials (she graduated from the state law school, law
review, Order of the Coif, but probably without mention of any
law review articles authored by the candidate), or innocuous
statements such as, “I promise to uphold the rule of law,”
although that statement can become controversial if stated in
the context of a discussion of a subject such as abortion.
We are familiar with the oft-repeated observations of Judge
Richard Posner in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,5 in
which he noted that every issue is potentially subject to litiga-
tion that may come before an elected judge.  Similarly, the “rule
of silence” was impractical because it gave voters no valuable
Jan Witold Baran
Judicial Candidate Speech After
Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White
a candidate for critical statements of past judicial decisions even if
Wersal was not so sanctioned.  Id.  The Court found:  “In any
event, it is clear that the announce clause prohibits a judicial can-
didate from stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal
question within the province of the court for which he is running,
except in the context of discussing past decisions—and in the lat-
ter context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not bound
by stare decisis.”  Id. at 2534.
What the opinion “politely” did not elaborate is the practice of
Minnesota to speak out of both sides of its mouth.  The lawyers
board may not have sanctioned Wersal for some statements but it
interpreted the announce clause broadly, not at all, or, as Schotland
notes from the Court’s opinion, “equivocally.”  The effect is to
make the announce clause as broad as described by the Court.
Candidates, who are most likely to debate issues, are challengers
and practicing attorneys.  The reason why there are so few enforce-
ment cases under the announce clause is the in terrorem effect of
broad or ambiguous interpretations.  Candidates, including
Wersal, succumb to the “rule of silence” rather than risk com-
plaints and the resulting damage to their careers.  It is precisely
this Dickensian type of gamesmanship by disciplinary committees
that may result in additional First Amendment court decisions
striking down “pledges and promises” provisions.
5. 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993).
information and actually distorted the sources and flow of
information, not from the candidates and their campaigns, but
from others, so-called third-party independent speakers, or in
the modern vernacular of campaign finance reform, the “special
interests.”  Perhaps the reason the issue of the “announce”
clause became so prominent—and perhaps even the reason the
Supreme Court took the Minnesota case—is that judicial elec-
tions have become more like all other elections.  In more and
more states, the courts (especially supreme courts) have
become lightening rods for dissatisfied constituencies.  As a
result of public policy issues being resolved in courts rather
than in legislatures, the bench is increasingly viewed as a polit-
ical participant.  One need not claim that any particular judicial
decision is wrong or not within the province of a court.
Assuming that the courts are performing their proper roles,
they nonetheless are making big policy decisions that are creat-
ing large numbers of dissatisfied citizens who are responding by
mobilizing in the elections.  The consequences are many.  First,
it means that judges, particularly statewide elected judges, must
raise more and more money.  Second, in those states with par-
tisan elections, the political parties see judicial elections as part
of an overall political agenda.  This has made races for the
bench in some states merely a part of the overall partisan elec-
toral warfare.  
In addition, independent interest groups have waded into
the breach.  Business organizations, trial lawyers, organized
labor, and others increasingly sponsor advertising in connec-
tion with judicial elections.  In this escalating environment, the
question is, what can the candidates themselves say about their
own campaigns when more and more other voices are com-
menting on the race?  Some have suggested that the rule of
silence could silence everyone.6 Yet the Minnesota case
answered an important question:  If candidates cannot be
restricted in what they say based on due process concerns, then
similar due process concerns would not justify restrictions on
what third parties might say.  The Court’s decision striking
down the announce clause certainly seems to bolster the view
that the speech of third parties cannot be restricted.
Now that Minnesota’s “rule of silence” has been struck
down, where can a line be drawn?  What are the implications
for restricting candidate statements?  What is the future of judi-
cial campaigns?
First, perhaps a new approach to the announce clause is pos-
sible.  Professor Gillers once proposed a revision to the Canon
5 announce clause.  His proposed rule is as follows:  “A candi-
date for judicial office may state his or her general views on
legal issues, but must make it clear that these views are tenta-
tive and subject to arguments of counsel and deliberation.” 7
The proposed Gillers rule has the advantage of permitting
candidates to speak, but also reinforces to the voters the fact
that judges must judge.  They cannot prejudge.  At the same
time the proposed revised rule does not silence candidates.  It
allows candidates to exercise
their prerogative to state their
views about legal issues, but
requires them to express a
commonsense caveat.  A rule
that requires a candidate to
say something, of course, may
have its own First
Amendment deficiencies. 
Regardless of whether the
announce clause can or
should be modified, there still
remains in Canon 5 the provi-
sion that prohibits candidates
from making “pledges or
promises.”  The Minnesota
case did not challenge that clause and there is much sympathy
for the concept of banning promises.  Nevertheless, the clause
presents problems of its own.  First, there is the issue of vague-
ness.  What constitutes a pledge or promise?  In Texas, a judge
was issued a public warning because his campaign literature
stated: “I’m very tough on crimes where there are victims who
have been physically harmed . . . .   I have no feelings for the
criminal.”8 The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct con-
sidered these statements as a pledge “not to show leniency
toward violent criminals.”9 But is it a pledge?  Was the judge
pledging or was he announcing his view on the legal issue of
whether there should be tough sentencing of violent criminals?  
In New York, a civil court judge was censured for violating
the pledges or promises clause because his “campaign litera-
ture gave the unmistakable impression that he would favor
tenants over landlords in housing matters.”10 The candidate
(who won) created the “unmistakable impression” by pointing
out that he was a tenant while his opponent was a landlord,
and by using testimonials from tenants who complimented his
handling of cases as a housing judge.  At what point did the
candidate step over the line?  Was it when he accurately
described himself as a tenant and his opponent as a landlord,
when he stated that he was a housing judge, or when he intro-
duced the testimonials?  Will housing judges who rent apart-
ments in New York not be allowed to share this information
with the public because it would create the “unmistakable
impression” that they are pro-tenant?
The vagueness of the “pledges and promises” clause could be
compounded by uneven or sweeping enforcement.  If judicial
commissions apply the pledges and promises clause as broadly
as the Minnesota commission interpreted its announce clause,
it will suffer a similar constitutional fate.  At oral argument in
Minnesota, Justice O’Connor cynically guessed that the
announce clause was being used to “maintain incumbent
judges.”  In the short term, the state supreme courts will have
to grapple with defining the remainder of Canon 5 to give can-
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6. See Deborah Goldberg & Mark Kozlowski, Constitutional Issues in
Disclosure of Interest Group Activities, 35 IND. L. REV. 755, 765-766
(2002); but see Jan Baran, Compelled Disclosure of Independent
Political Speech and Constitutional Limitations, 35 IND. L. REV. 769
(2002).
7. See Gillers, supra note 2, at 733.
8. Bruce Hight, Judge Violated Conduct Code, Panel Decides, AUSTIN-
AMERICAN STATESMAN, Jan. 31, 2001.
9. Id.
10. NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 17, 1997.  
The proposed
Gillers rule has
the advantage 
of permitting 
candidates to
speak, but also
reinforces to the
voters the fact
that judges must
judge.  They 
cannot prejudge.
groups tend to respond to such advertising in defense of the
candidate.  The American Bar Association, for example, is
encouraging the creation of civic groups for exactly such pur-
poses.11
Finally, there is a clear solution to the dilemmas created by
judicial elections.  Justice O’Connor devoted her concurring
opinion to the history of judicial elections.  In adopting elec-
tions, she noted that “the State has voluntarily taken on the
risks to judicial bias.”12 Implicitly, she was suggesting that elec-
tions be replaced with judicial selections.  In light of historical
public insistence on elections, merit selection is a difficult
proposition, but not one to abandon.
In sum, the Minnesota case creates the opportunity for more
debate.  The quantity of additional debate will increasingly
depend on the candidates.  The “rule of silence” has been struck
down, but there still may be occasions where silence will be
golden—and prudent politics.
Jan Witold Baran is a partner in the Washington,
D.C., law firm of Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP,
where he heads the Election Law and
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President Bush’s Commission on Federal Ethics
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Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns.  Baran
is past chair of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Election Law and
is currently Special Advisor to the ABA’s Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence.  He authored an amicus brief filed with the
Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White on
behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
didates sufficient clarity while acknowledging that candidates
have a constitutional right to discuss political and legal issues.
That will be a daunting task.
At the same time, candidates must grapple with their new
“freedom.”  It is one thing to have freedom of speech.  What to
say is something else.  In an election campaign, a candidate will
be asked, “What is your position on X?”  In the past the candi-
date could say, “I cannot comment on that topic because it is a
legal or political issue.”  While a candidate no longer can point
to Canon 5 for justification, she can still make a similar
response.  Judicial candidates can adopt the time-honored prac-
tice of other politicians by evading direct answers.  Unlike most
other politicians, judicial candidates will have a good political
reason to evade answers.  The public has different expectations
of judicial candidates.  They want their judges to be fair, even-
handed, and unprejudiced.  Judicial candidates should capital-
ize on that expectation whenever possible.  Therefore, when
asked, “What is your position on X?,” a candidate, even after
Minnesota, should consider stating (even if she has already
opined in past opinions or articles), “I don’t think it is appro-
priate for a judge [or prospective judge] to make statements on
this issue.  It may come before the court when I will hear and
consider all the arguments.”  This type of response at times may
not be possible, or may require further explanation with some
“neutral” comment about “issue X.”  However, free speech is
not compulsory speech and voters expect something from a
judge that is not expected of a governor or congressman—fewer
press releases and more decorum.
As for questions from or advertising “attacks” by third-party
organizations, the candidate will have to exercise even more
restraint.  Experience suggests that candidates in such circum-
stances benefit from backlash and sympathy.  Supporting
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11. Recommendation of the ABA Standing Committees on Judicial
Independence and Election Law, at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/recommendations02/113.pdf (Aug. 2002).
12. 122 S. Ct. at 2544.
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Footnotes 
1. 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
2. Justice at Stake is a nonpartisan national partnership working to
keep courts fair and impartial.  Partner organizations include the
American Bar Association, the Constitution Project, the League of
Women Voters, and the National Center for State Courts, as well
as various state-specific organizations.  For more information
consult the Justice at Stake website at www.justiceatstake.org.
3. In addition to citing the two questions asked of the public used in
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, the Brennan Center brief
also reported on three questions from the judges’ survey in sup-
port of the claim that “[m]any judges are acutely aware of the role
of money in judicial elections.”  Brief for the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University School of Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 16, Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-1521).
4. 122 S. Ct. at 2543 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor
paired her survey-derived evidence with anecdotal evidence about
the actual role of campaign contributions in influencing deci-
sions. 
5. Telephone numbers were generated by a random digit dial
process, which allowed access to all listed and unlisted phones.
The list was stratified by state.  Quotas were assigned to reflect the
percentage of households within these states.  The data were
weighted by gender, region, education, age, and race to ensure the
sample is an accurate reflection of the population.  Findings are
subject to a margin of error of +/- 3.1 percent.  To maximize the
number of questions that could be asked, some questions are
based on 500 respondents.  This increases the margin of error to
+/- 4.4 percent.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s first decision on judicial elec-tions—Republican Party of Minnesota v. White1—came onthe heels of the first national opinion survey devoted
entirely to judicial selection issues.  In late 2001, 1,000 ran-
domly selected members of the public and 2,500 state appellate
and trial judges answered questions about their participation in
judicial elections, opinions about current practices, and sup-
port for various reform proposals.  Some questions were asked
of judges and public alike, while other questions concentrated
on their respective roles in the election process.  The surveys
were conducted on behalf of the Justice at Stake Campaign, a
nationwide coalition of legal and citizen organizations con-
cerned with preserving judicial independence.2
These surveys present a unique opportunity to evaluate
empirically some of the explicit and implicit assertions made by
respondents, lower courts, amici curiae, and the Supreme Court
justices concerning what the public thinks and wants, and how
judges experience campaigning and the canons.  Indeed, the
survey’s findings are a part of the record in the White decision.
One amicus brief (filed by the Brennan Center)3 and Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion cited the survey.  All references
are to survey questions about the influence of judicial campaign
fundraising.  Justice O’Connor noted that: 
Even if judges were able to refrain from favoring
donors, the mere possibility that judges’ decisions
may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign
contributors is likely to undermine the public’s confi-
dence in the judiciary. See Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
Research, Inc., and American Viewpoint, National
Public Opinion Survey Frequency Questionnaire 4
(2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/
files/JASNationalSurveyResuls.pdf) (describing sur-
vey results indicating that 76 percent of registered vot-
ers believe that campaign contributions influence
judicial decisions); id., at 7 (describing survey results
indicating that two-thirds of registered voters believe
individuals and groups who give money to judicial
candidates often receive favorable treatment).4
The surveys have more to say on the topic of campaign
fundraising by judges, and include questions that describe judi-
cial and voter behavior at election time.  Survey participants
were also asked to indicate their support for various proposals
for improving judicial elections.  
Other questions sought more abstract impressions of what it
means to be a judge.  The status of the judge as a politician was
a particular theme.  Questions ask how judges should campaign
and how judges compare to other public officials who run for
office. The survey thus allows some exploration of fundamen-
tal concerns about judicial independence and accountability.
The result is a complex image of judges.  Both judges and the
public hold equivocal views of where the judge as decision-
maker intersects with the judge as fundraiser and campaigner.  
THE SURVEY
The firm of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc.
designed and administered the telephone survey of 1,000 ran-
domly selected sample of (self-identified) registered voters.
American Viewpoint, a survey firm with a largely Republican
client base, collaborated with Greenberg Quinlan, which has a
largely Democratic client base, to ensure bipartisanship in the
choice of questions and question wording.  Four focus groups
were used to fine-tune the questions.  The survey was con-
ducted October 30-November 7, 2001.5
The same collaboration carried out the separate, national
survey of state judges by mail from November 5, 2001 to
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The White Decision 
in the Court of Opinion:
Views of Judges and the General Public
David B. Rottman
6. The total judges’ sample is subject to a margin of error (MOE) of
+/- 2 percent, and each separate sample to a higher margin of error
(supreme court sample, MOE = +/- 7.2 percent; appellate sample,
MOE = +/- 4.3 percent; lower court sample, MOE = +/- 2.4 per-
cent).
7. See David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial
Elections Unique?, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1369 (2001) (quoting
Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1998,
at 74 (noting that recent changes in judicial elections had made
them “noisier, nastier, and costlier”).
January 2, 2002.  Survey questionnaires were completed and
returned by 61 percent of the recipients, a strikingly high rate
of participation.6 The 2,428 participating judges included 188
state supreme court justices, 527 intermediate appellate court
judges, and 1,713 trial court judges.  Survey participants
include about one judge in ten.  
ASSERTIONS ABOUT WHAT 
JUDGES EXPERIENCE AS CANDIDATES 
The judge’s survey inquired about experiences as a candi-
date, preferences in terms of reform, evaluation of their state’s
canons, their view of the judicial role, and concerns about judi-
cial elections.  How judges respond is shown in tables and
charts.  Each table and chart repeats the exact wording of the
question.  The views of supreme court justices, intermediate
appellate court judges, and trial judges tend to be similar.  The
text notes instances where the world looked differently depend-
ing on the level of court a judge occupied.  
(1) Judicial elections today are “nastier, nosier, and costlier.”
“Nastier, nosier, and costlier” is a punchy description of how
judicial elections have changed in recent years.7 That change is
evident in a number of states, especially for supreme court
races.  A survey question asked the judges if they believe the
conduct and tone of judicial campaigns has changed over the
past 5 years (see Table 1). The majority of judges (61%) per-
ceive a decline in the conduct and tone of judicial campaigns
over the past 5 years.  Thirty percent of the judges saw no
change.  One judge in ten sensed an improvement.  
The responses suggest that concern over declining standards in
judicial campaign conduct is widespread, certainly present in
many states and at all court levels, but not universal. 
The survey also asked judges if they were satisfied with the
way judicial campaigns are conducted.  Despite the sense of
decline just noted, judges are evenly split between those satis-
fied and those dissatisfied with the conduct and tone of cam-
paigns (see Table 2).
(2) Judges are preoccupied with raising campaign funds.
It is recognized that in some states a viable judicial candi-
date, especially for a supreme court seat, must raise very large
sums of money.  The survey asked the judges if they felt under
pressure to raise campaign money (see Table 3).  Of judges run-
ning for election, 59% describe themselves as being under pres-
sure to raise money for their campaign during election years.
Most report being under “a great deal of pressure” (57% of
supreme court justices, 49% of intermediate appellate court
judges, and 40% of trial judges).  Few (only 10% for supreme
court justices) describe the pressure as “just a little” or “none at
all.”  Thus, it appears that the demands of fundraising are being
experienced throughout the judiciary.  
The survey strongly suggests the pressure to raise campaign
funds is pervasive, experienced by the majority of judges, both
trial and appellate.   
(3) Judges face public criticism from within and outside their
state.  
The majority of judges report having been publicly criticized
in their role of judge.  This was most often the case among
supreme court justices (76%) but common among intermediate
appellate court justices (54%) and trial judges (56%).  The sur-
vey asked participants to identify the source of the criticism (see
Table 4).  The media and within-state special interest groups
were the most frequent sources of criticism.  Other officials
ranked third as the most frequent critics.  Public criticism from
other judicial candidates was rare, even among supreme court
justices.  Nearly one-half of supreme court justices report
receiving criticism from special interest groups within their
state, as do about one-fourth of other judges.  Criticism from
national interest groups is less common but experienced by
about one in five supreme court justices.  Eighteen percent of
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TABLE 1
Do you think the conduct and tone of judicial campaigns 
has gotten better or worse over the past 5 years?
Much better 2 %
Somewhat better 7
Stayed the same 30
Somewhat worse 38
Much worse 23
Total 100 %
TABLE 2
How satisfied are you with the conduct 
and tone of judicial campaigns?
Very satisfied 14 %
Somewhat satisfied 39
Somewhat dissatisfied 31
Very dissatisfied 17
Total 100 %
TABLE 3
If under pressure to raise money:  
How much pressure are you under to raise money for your
campaign during election years?
Intermediate 
Supreme Court Appellate Trial
Great deal 57% 49 % 40%
Some 33 32 40
Just a little 3 6 7
None at all 7 14 13
100% 100 % 100%
8. The question read, “If yes, what are the two most important reasons
that you held back or felt restrained in responding to criticism?”  
supreme court justices, 5% of intermediate appellate judges,
and 3% of trial judges reported criticism from national special
interest groups.  
(4) The canons restrict the ability of judicial candidates to
counter speech with more speech.  
The overwhelming majority (89%) of judges who had been
criticized felt that they “held back or felt restrained” in respond-
ing.  The canons were the most frequently cited reason for
restraint, mentioned by 73% of those reporting criticism.8 The
other commonly cited reasons were “a personal belief that
judges should not respond” (cited by 43%) and “the criticism
wasn’t worthy of a response” (34%).
Another question sought an evaluation of the impact of the
canons on judicial behavior.  The response varied by type of
court:  51% of supreme court justices, 60% of intermediate
appellate judges, and 71% of trial judges agreed with the state-
ment (see Table 5).  It appears that supreme court justices are
subject to more criticism than judges at other levels but are less
concerned with restrictions imposed by the canons.  
The sense of being restrained does not necessarily indicate a
desire to weaken or even change the canons.  Most judges at all
levels felt that their state’s code contained the right amount and
type of restrictions (see Table 6).
Judges who feel their state’s canons are too restrictive greatly
outnumber those who perceive too few restrictions.  Yet most
judges—nearly two-thirds—view the canons as being of the
right amount and type.  
(5) Judges place boundaries on their own campaign behavior. 
The survey identifies some areas in which nearly all judges
believe a judicial candidate cannot stray.  One question dealt
with the “pledge or promise” provision in many canons, unaf-
fected by the White decision.  Judges were asked how strongly
they support or oppose the following statement:  “Judicial can-
didates should never make promises during elections about
how they will rule in cases that may come before them.”
Strong support was offered by 97% of the judges.  Only a hand-
ful (out of nearly 2,500 judge participants) strongly opposed
the statement.  
Another area was examined in a question that sought the
degree of support for the proposition, “Judicial candidates
should commit to not making misleading or unfair accusations
about opponents during elections.”  Strong support came from
93% of the judges surveyed.
For the most part, supreme court, intermediate appellate
judges, and trial judges reported similar experiences and
expressed similar opinions.  A striking finding is the perva-
siveness of pressure to raise funds and public criticism.  The
relatively small number of high-profile supreme court races
tells only a part of the story of how judicial elections are being
conducted. 
WHAT THE PUBLIC THINKS AND WANTS
The telephone survey of the public included more questions
than the postal survey completed by judges.  A wide range of
topics was covered.  These include the record of voting for
judicial candidates, evaluations of judges, courts, and other
organizations, concerns over judicial selection and decision
making, and preferences among various reform proposals.
Most topics were approached through several types of ques-
tions, enriching what the survey findings can tell us.  The ben-
efit of such a multifaceted approach comes in what we can
learn about core issues like whether being elected makes a
judge a politician in the same sense as legislators and gover-
nors.  
(1) Judges are politicians . . . .
One survey question took a direct approach to the issue of
whether judges are politicians.  The survey participants were
read a series of words and phrases that people use to describe
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TABLE 4
Have you ever been publicly criticized in your role as judge
by any of the following individuals or groups?
Intermediate 
Supreme Court Appellate Trial
The media 56% 34 % 38%
Special interest 
group in state 46 24 22
Other public 
official 38 18 20
Other judicial 
candidate 23 9 11
National special 
interest group 18 5 3
TABLE 5
Do you feel that your state’s Code of Judicial Conduct 
prevents judges from adequately responding to unfair or 
misleading criticism of decisions?
Intermediate 
Supreme Court Appellate Trial
Yes 51% 60 % 71%
No 49 40 29
Total 100% 100 % 100%
TABLE 6
Do you feel that your state’s Code of Judicial Conduct 
contains too many restrictions on judicial campaign speech,
too few restrictions, or the right amount and type of 
restrictions on judicial campaign speech?
The right amount and type 64 %
Too many restrictions? 30
Too few restrictions. 6
100 %
9. Other proportions of “very well” responses include “indepen-
dent” (13%), “honest and trustworthy” (14%), and “qualified”
(24%).  It is possible that the context provided by earlier survey
questions heightened sensitivity to the role of judge as political
candidate.
10. The information contained in the statement might be seen as
making the case for treating judges as different.  Other questions,
however, use wording that might be seen as arguing in the oppo-
site direction.
11. That statement was read to one half of the survey participants.
The other half was read a statement that ended with, “We must
take concrete steps to ensure that judges are shielded from exces-
sive partisan political pressure that other public officials face.”
The majority of respondents found that a convincing argument,
but to a lesser degree than for the notion of judges as free to make
judges and then asked to say how well each describes judges
(the choices were “very well,” “well,” “not too well,” and “not
well at all”).  “Political” was included in the list.  Most survey
participants felt that “political” describes judges “very well”
(34%) or “well” (44%). Only 4% felt “political” describes
judges “not well at all.”  The identification of judge with
“political” is striking because of the 12 words and phrases
(including “impartial,” “committed to the public interest,”
and “qualified”) that were tested, “political” attracted the
largest proportion of describes “very well” responses.9
(2) But judges are a special kind of politician.
Although judges are seen as “political,” it may be that the
public attaches some caveats that distinguish judges from
executive and legislative branch officials.  Other questions pur-
sued the meaning of political in the judicial context through an
abstract approach, addressing concerns such as judicial inde-
pendence.  One question of that kind involved a statement:
Judges should be treated differently than other
public officials since they must make independent
decisions about what the law says.  Judges should
not have to raise money like politicians, make cam-
paign promises like politicians, or answer to special
interests.  We must take concrete steps to ensure that
judges can make unpopular decisions based only on
the facts and the law.10
Respondents were asked if they found the statement very
convincing, somewhat convincing, a little convincing, or not
at all convincing. Eighty-two percent found the statement
either very convincing (52%) or somewhat convincing
(30%).11
A less wordy, but again somewhat abstract approach to pub-
lic sentiment on the uniqueness of the judiciary was taken by
asking survey participants to choose between a pair of state-
ments.  One statement describes courts as institutions that
should be free of political and public pressure and the other
posits that courts are just like other institutions and thus
should not be free of those pressures (see Table 7).  Survey par-
ticipants were asked to say which statement is closer to their
own view.  
The responses suggest the public sees the judiciary as
unique, rather than similar to other institutions.  Eighty-one
percent opt for the statement that courts are unique.  
The survey finds that the public image of the courts and
judges contains a strong political component.  The image also
contains a strong sense that the judicial branch is unique.  Such
ambiguities and complexities are characteristic of public opin-
ion on the courts and generally.  Consistency is not the most
prominent feature of public opinion. 
(3) Judicial elections damage the public standing of the judi-
ciary.
As Justice O’Connor noted, a considerable majority of
Americans express concern over judges as campaign fundrais-
ers.  Does that concern translate into lower levels of trust in
courts and judges?  The survey evidence suggests that it might.
Survey participants were asked, “How much trust and confi-
dence do you have in courts and judges in your state?”  The
response choices offered to survey participants were “a great
deal” (25%), “some” (53%), “just a little” (16%), or “none at
all” (5%). 
Whether people believe campaign fundraising influences
judges is related to their trust in the courts (see Chart 1).  “A
great deal” of trust in the courts is expressed by 16% of partic-
ipants who perceive “a great deal” of influence from campaign
fundraising and by 40% of those who see no influence from
campaign contributions.12
There is a statistically significant relationship between con-
cern over fundraising and trust in the courts.  The relationship
is negative because the greater the concern over contributions,
the lower the twist.  Statistical significance gives us confidence
that even if we asked the same questions of another group of
1,000 randomly selected adults, the relationship of perceived
influence with trust would be about the same.  
The strength of the relationship between perceived influence
TABLE 7
Courts are unique institutions of government that should
be free of political and public pressure.
Courts are just like other institutions of government and
should not be free of political and public pressure.
First statement much more convincing 62 %
First statement somewhat more convincing 19
Second statement somewhat more convincing 10
Second statement much more convincing 9
100 %
unpopular decisions.  Overall, 73% of respondents found the
statement on partisanship convincing (split evenly between very
and somewhat so).  
12. Other recent surveys confirm the public’s unease with judges as
campaign fundraisers and the association between that unease
and levels of trust in the courts.  Relevant surveys include
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1999) and NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE
PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999).
Reports on both surveys have appeared in previous issues of Court
Review.  See An Interview with Phil Anderson and Marilyn Goldman,
COURT REVIEW, Winter 1998, at 8; and David B. Rottman & Alan
J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts:  What Public
Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, COURT REVIEW, Fall 1999, at 24.
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and trust is measured separately.  That relationship is weak.
Here, we measured how well knowing a person’s views  about
campaign fundraising correlates with their evaluation of the
judiciary.  A score of 1.0 indicates a perfect relationship—if you
know how a person feels about campaign fundraising, you can
exactly predict their trust in the courts.  A score of zero means
knowing a person’s view on fundraising tells us nothing about
their level of trust.  The correlation between the influence and
trust is on the low side:  -.21.13
While those who disapprove of fundraising by judges are less
likely to trust the courts, that is only a small part of a much
larger story.  There is no reason to single out campaign fundrais-
ing as looming larger in importance to the public than other
issues related to the role and performance of the judiciary. 
(4) Voters fail to participate in judicial elections because they
lack adequate information to choose among the candidates.
The survey offers some support for the belief that a lack of
information on the candidates is a factor underlying the reluc-
tance to participate in judicial elections.  First, the survey con-
firms the relatively low amount of information potential voters
have on judicial candidates (see Table 8).  
The public divides evenly between those who have at least
“some” information and those who have “just a little” or less
information.  
Second, the survey measures the relatively low rate of voter
participation in judicial elections (see Table 9).  
The survey provides two benchmarks to compare voting in
judicial elections to the rates in other types of elections.  Eighty-
seven percent of participants said they had voted in the 2000
presidential election.  When asked to look ahead to the 2002
congressional elections, 72% said they were “almost certain” to
vote, 18% said they would probably vote, and 8% gave the prob-
ability as 50-50.  Three percent said they did not think they
would vote.   The survey findings are consistent with actual vot-
ing percentages. 14 There is a voter “roll-off” in which voters
who cast ballots for “top-of-the-ticket” races like those for gov-
ernor, but fail to vote in any judicial election.15
The most commonly offered reason survey participants give
for not voting is that they “don’t know enough about the candi-
dates” (cited by 18% of the survey participants).  “Don’t have
time” was the second most common answer (cited by 11% of
participants).  
Third, those who claim possession of a great deal of informa-
tion are more likely to vote in judicial elections (see Chart 2).
Those claiming possession of “a great deal” of candidate infor-
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13. The statistic is Spearman’s rho, a measure of the strength of the
relationship between two variables appropriate for ordinal data
(where responses to a question go from high to low but at inter-
vals that are not fixed).  For example, we do not know if in a
response to a question asking about support for, say, merit selec-
tion, the distance between strongly support and somewhat sup-
port is the same as the distance between somewhat support and
somewhat oppose.   
14. It is likely that there is some exaggeration of frequency with
which participants actually vote in judicial elections.  Survey
responses can be affected by what people think they should do.
An indirect measure of voting can be obtained from the survey.
About one in four (38%) survey respondents said they “always
vote” in response to the question of why they did not vote in judi-
cial elections.  This compares with the 59% who stated that they
“almost always vote” in judicial races.  According to the U.S.
Census, 86% of registered voters cast their ballot for President in
2000.  Press Release, Bureau of the Census, Registered Voter
Turnout Improved in 2000 Presidential Election, Census Bureau
Reports (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/2002/cb02-31.html.
15. Roll-off rates during the 1990s ranged from 15% to 25% in reten-
tion elections (Florida), 33% to 42% in nonpartisan elections
(Washington state), and 8% to 14% in partisan elections (Texas).
Straight-party votes are more responsible for the low roll-offs
found in partisan elections than the excitement generated by con-
tested, hard-fought campaigns.  Charles H. Sheldon & Linda S.
Maule, CHOOSING JUSTICE:  THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL
JUDGES 63, 83, 143 (1999).
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TABLE 8
Thinking back to the last time there was an election for
judges in your state, how much information would you say
you had about the candidates in those election?  
A great deal of information 13 %
Some information 38
Just a little information 35
No information at all 14
100 %
TABLE 9
Thinking specifically about judicial elections, how frequently
do you vote in elections for judges?  
Almost always 59 %
Sometimes 17
Not often 6
Almost never 16
100 %
mation claim that they almost always vote in judicial elections.
Among potential voters with no candidate information, only
one in four report being “almost always” likely to vote.  
Having information on judicial candidates is related to the
extent to which people take an active interest in political life
generally.  Survey participants were asked if contributed money
to political parties or candidates.  About 40% were contributing
and they claimed greater knowledge about judicial candidates
and about how the courts work.  Being a campaign contributor
is related to a person’s education.  Concern over influence of
campaign contributions, however, was the same among political
contributors and noncontributors.  
(5) The public is unwilling to give up the right to vote in the judi-
cial selection process.
The public prefers to elect judges despite a lack of informa-
tion about the candidates, concern about campaign fundraising
by judges, and low rates of voter participation in judicial elec-
tions.  The preference to vote emerges clearly from the responses
survey participants gave when offered a direct choice (see Table
10).  The question offered two statements about how judges
should be selected and asked which they found the most con-
vincing.  
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Elected judges were preferred to appointed judges.  The first
statement was closer to the views of 80% of respondents.  
(6) The public values judicial accountability.
Two questions, one on public criticism and the other on free
speech, provide insight into the public’s thinking about the
appropriate balance between judicial independence and
accountability.  The question on public criticism took the form
of paired statements. Participants indicate which statement is
the more convincing (see Table 11).
Two-thirds of the public survey respondents were convinced
by the notion that criticism is conducive to accountability.  Few
saw criticism as intimidation.
Another survey question used a more abstract form of words
to investigate the importance placed on judicial accountability
relative to other considerations.  A statement was read and the
participants were asked to say how convincing they found it to
be (see Table 12).
The response to the statement is mixed.  The statement con-
vinces the majority of respondents.  The balance was tipped
toward the side of “somewhat” rather than “very” convincing. 
Overall, the public is equivocal in how it views the judiciary.
On the one hand, it appears to see judges as political and to
desire that judges be held accountable through the electoral
process.  On the other hand, it regards judges as different from
other elected officials.  Somehow campaign funding by a judi-
cial candidate is qualitatively different that fundraising by a leg-
16. The balance weighed less in favor of elections when it was paired
against “Judges in my state should be initially appointed to office,
then voters should have a chance to decide whether the judge
stays in office.”  Fifty-four percent favored the first statement and
42% the second.  
TABLE 10
Judges in my state should be elected to office.
Judges in my state should be appointed to office.  
First statement much more convincing 63 %
First statement somewhat more convincing 18
Second statement somewhat more convincing 8
Second statement much more convincing 12
Total     100 %
TABLE 11
Public criticism of judges makes judges more accountable
and leads to better decisions.  
Public criticism of judges often intimidates them and
leads to worse decisions.  
First statement much more convincing 39 %
First statement somewhat more convincing 31
Second statement somewhat more convincing 19
Second statement much more convincing 12
Total     100 %
TABLE 12
Our courts and judges must be accountable to the people.  
So-called reforms that limit the ability of citizens to educate
others about the decisions of judges are a fundamental assault
on the Constitution.  People who say they’re out to reform the
system are really just trying to take away your right to vote. 
Very convincing 26 %
Somewhat convincing 36
A little convincing 19
Not at all convincing 19
Total     100 %
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Likelihood of Voting in Judicial Elections 
by Information About Candidate
H
O
W
 F
RE
QU
EN
TL
Y
D
O
 Y
O
U
VO
TE
 IN
 J
UD
IC
IA
L
EL
EC
TI
O
NS
?
HOW MUCH INFORMATION DID YOU 
HAVE ON CANDIDATES?
6%
5%0%
8%
8%
islative or executive candidate.  Perhaps the public image of the
judiciary contains the elements that many groups and individu-
als concerned with the White case sought to reconcile.  
(7) The public and the judges disagree on how judges should be
selected.
The surveys identify some points of agreement and disagree-
ment in the priorities of judges and the public for improving
judicial elections.  That difference may be related to a funda-
mental divergence in the opinions of judges and public.  Judges
give themselves high marks, while the public gives far lower
marks to the quality of the job being done by the courts in their
state (see Chart 3).  A judge is seven times more likely than
members of the public to rate courts and judges as doing an
excellent job (35% versus 5%).  The public is evenly split
between those holding positive and negative views of the judi-
ciary, while 96% of judges describe the courts as doing an excel-
lent or good job.  
Such a fundamental difference is likely to color how each
group approaches the topic of judicial selection.  
The gap between what the public and judges think is also
found in the question of whether campaign contributions influ-
ence judges’ decisions.  The public’s assessment of the impact
campaign contributions made to judges have on their decisions
is at odds with the judiciary’s view (see Chart 4).  Thirty-eight
percent of the public and 5% of the judges surveyed attribute “a
great deal of influence” to campaign contributions.  
Eight specific reform proposals were presented to judges and
the general public (see Table 13).  The reaction to five of the pro-
posals was roughly similar among judges and the public.  Most
proposals were either strongly or somewhat supported by
judges and the public alike.  
There were two main points of difference.  First, the public is
more supportive than judges of proposals that would bring
more information or more public participation into the judicial
election process.  This is particularly true of voters’ guides that
would provide a standard source of information on candidates
(51% of judges and 72% of the public strongly agreed with that
proposal). There is also greater public support for establishing
independent citizen boards to inform the public about mislead-
ing advertising in judicial campaigns.  These are differences in
degree.  Both proposals receive support (“strong” or “some-
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Public Judges
How much influence do you think 
campaign contributions made to 
judges have on their decisions?
6%
5%
45%
37%
35%
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Poor
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Public Judges
How would you rate the job being done
by courts and judges in your state?
CHART 3
CHART 4
12%
5%
5%
TABLE 13
EIGHT REFORM PROPOSALS:  
SUPPORT BY JUDGES AND PUBLIC
A series of proposals have been made to help improve the
way we elect judges.  For each one, please mark whether you
strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or
strongly oppose the proposal.  
Proportion Giving 
Strong Support
Public Judges
States should provide voter guides prior 72 % 51 %
to judicial elections to help inform voters 
about the candidates in each race
States should require that all judicial 72 80
candidates disclose the individuals, 
parties, or organizations who donate 
money to their campaigns
States should require that all political 74 87
advertisements in judicial elections 
clearly state who is paying for the ad
Independent citizen boards should be 56 45
established to inform the public about 
misleading or inaccurate advertising in
judicial campaigns
States should limit campaign contributions 55 45
to judicial candidates
Judges should be prohibited from presiding 68 35
over and ruling in cases when one of the
sides has given money to their campaign 
Judicial candidates should condemn 60 83
negative or misleading advertising done 
on their behalf  
Judicial candidates should commit to not 72 93
making misleading or unfair accusations 
about opponents during elections
what”) from a sizable majority of judges and members of the
public.  
The second point of difference is in the behavior of judges in
relation to or in response to campaigning.  Judges are stronger
supporters of a proposal that judicial candidates should con-
demn negative or misleading advertising done on their 83% per-
cent of judges and 60% of the public gave “strong support” to
that proposal.  
The sharpest difference between judges and the public is
about a prohibition on presiding over cases in which one of the
sides contributed to their election campaign. The public was
more supportive than judges of the proposal that “Judges should
be prohibited from presiding over and ruling in cases when one
of the sides has given money to their campaign” (see Chart 5).
Two-thirds of the public but only one-third of judges strongly
support a prohibition on presiding over cases when one side has
given money to a judge’s campaign.  Even so, a majority of
judges (61%) gave either some or strong support to that pro-
posal.  The public was also more supportive of establishing
independent citizen boards to inform the public about mislead-
ing or inaccurate advertising in judicial campaigns.  
A majority of both judges and the public agreed that “[j]udi-
cial candidates should commit to not making misleading or
unfair accusations about opponents during elections.” 
(8) The judicial selection reform agenda is divisive.  
Although the public and judges responded similarly to some
specific proposals for improving judicial elections, their views
diverged when it came to assessing merit selection.  Both judge
and public survey respondents were given a summary of a pro-
posal based on the merit selection model:  a nonpartisan citizen
panel evaluates and then recommends a slate of potential
judges to the governor, who selects a nominee for confirmation
by the state legislature.  If confirmed, subsequent terms are
secured through retention elections.  The proposal receives
substantial support from the public but a less positive reaction
from intermediate appellate and trial court judges, who are
evenly split on the supporting and opposing positions.
Supreme court justices have a distinctive reaction to the pro-
posal: one-third strongly support and one-third strongly
oppose merit selection, with an overall majority (59%) in sup-
port (see Chart 6).  This is one of the instances in which the
level of court is related to a judge’s opinions about judicial
selection.  
CONCLUSION
The survey data challenge some assertions made in connec-
tion with the White case and support other assertions. Both chal-
lenges and support often come with clarification or modifica-
tion.  
There is support for the depiction of judicial election cam-
paigns as “nastier, nosier, and costlier” than before.  The strik-
ing finding from the judges’ survey is the extent to which con-
cern over elections and campaign fundraising activity is so per-
vasive.  Concern is not limited to the small number of states that
have made the news.  It is also not limited to supreme court
races. Still, public criticism by other candidates or by national
interest groups is infrequent.  
The data also support the claim that the canons restrict
responses to criticism.  However, there is no consensus among
judges that such restrictions need to be loosened. The majority
of judges believe that the existing canons in their state are just
right.  
The survey also suggests that there is a commitment on the
part of virtually all judges to keep judicial elections different.
Pledges or promises are viewed as improper, as is a commitment
to make misleading or unfair accusations against potential
opponents.  
Spring 2002 - Court Review 23
13%
68%
8%
35%
26%
23%
18%Strongly
oppose
Somewhat
oppose
Somewhat
support
Strongly
support
Public Judges
Judges should be prohibited from presiding over
and ruling in cases where one of the sides has
given money to their campaign.
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Supreme Intermediate Trial Public
Here is a summary of a proposal that deals with the
way judges are selected.
Under this proposal, a nonpartisan panel of citizens,
legal professionals, and civic leaders evaluates and rec-
ommends potential judges to the governor.  The governor
then chooses a nominee from the list who must then be
confirmed by the state legislature.  After each term, the
public then votes on whether a judge should keep the seat
or be removed from office.  If a judge is rejected, the selec-
tion process starts again.
Based on this statement, would you strongly support,
somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly
oppose such a proposal?
Strongly
oppose
Somewhat
oppose
Somewhat
support
Strongly
support
8%
17. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 233-34 (2d ed.
2000).
18. The response rate is on the high end of what is typical in postal
surveys administered to judges.  The rate is notable in that the
surveys were mailed in the immediate aftermath of September 11,
2001.  Other surveys have produced response rates ranging from
14% (Randall D. Lloyd, et al., An Exploration of State and Local
Judge Mobility, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 19, 26-27 (2001) (on contests to
judicial authority)), 33% (Rita James Simon, Judges’ Translations
of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, 13 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE 103 (1969) (on defining reasonable doubt)); and 41%
(Gordon Bazemore & Leslie Leip, Victim Participation in the New
Juvenile Court:  Tracking Judicial AttitudesToward Restorative Justice
Reforms, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 199, 205 (2000) (on juvenile court
judges)).  The importance of the topic to the judges surveyed is
an important factor in determining the response rate.
Other assertions attracted mixed or limited support.  Judges
are viewed as political, but generally the public comes down on
the side of respecting the unique responsibilities of the judicial
branch.  If judges are politicians, they are a very special kind of
politician.  The public wants judges to be subject to criticism
but generally supports provisions that modify the election
process to be appropriate for judicial office.  The survey pro-
vides grounds for viewing with caution the desire expressed in
this and other surveys to elect, not appoint judges.  The public
has an equivocal view of judges.  The various pieces forming
that view do not fit into a coherent whole. 
Voters in judicial elections are poorly informed; voters
acknowledge the limited information that they possess.  Voters
do not believe, however, that they are bereft of any information.
About one-half of registered voters report knowing at least
something about the judicial candidates in the last election. 
The public is more supportive than the judiciary of reforms
that will bring more information into judicial elections.  The
public is more persuaded than judges of the merits of efforts
like voters’ guides and campaign oversight committees.  At the
same time, the public is less convinced of the need for judicial
candidates to condemn misleading advertising done on their
behalf.  It is notable, however, that a reform agenda for judicial
elections attracts very substantial support among judges and
the public. 
Both of the surveys were professionally done and should
meet accepted tests for acceptance by the courts.  Under Rule
703 of the Federal Rule of Evidence, survey findings are
allowed as a basis for expert opinion when they “are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions.”  For survey results, the specific standard
may be stated this way: “Was the poll or survey constructed in
accordance with generally accepted principles, and were the
results used in a statistically correct way.”17
Here, both surveys meet that standard.  The judges’ survey is
unique in its authoritativeness.  Nearly one of every ten serving
American state judges participated.  The high rate of participa-
tion by judges is strong testimony on the topicality of judicial
selection.18
The public survey is unique in being devoted to the topic of
judicial selection.  The breadth and depth of its coverage gives
it considerable value.  
Perhaps the most striking finding from the public opinion
survey is the equivocal view people hold of judges and the judi-
ciary.  In some ways, this is to be expected.  Public thinking
about the judiciary is inchoate.  It is full of inconsistencies and
not well grounded in knowledge or experience.  That does not
mean, however, that public opinion is without substance or
importance.  The American public is shaky on the details but
gets the gist of our system.  They acknowledge that judges are
political, but consider them a unique sort of politician, ones
who play within a different set of rules than legislative or exec-
utive branch elected officials when campaigning.
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Footnotes 
1. For a more in-depth review of the decisions of the past term, see
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, RECENT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 2001-2002 (Amer. Acad. of Jud. Educ. 2002).
2. 122 S.Ct. 2105 (2002).
3. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
4. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
The United States Supreme Court’s 2001-2002 term at leastgave the appearance of a more unified Supreme Court—at least when compared to the previous term, which was
marked by an overwhelming number of 5-4 decisions—and
featured several unanimous or near unanimous decisions.
Specifically in the Fourth Amendment area, but also in other
cases, the Court seemed at times to break free from the typical
conservative-liberal divide that was so salient a year ago.  This
term, the Court confronted significant issues regarding the
increased susceptibility to searches and seizures of bus passen-
gers, students, and probationers; the death penalty and its lim-
itations; the assistance of counsel in minor criminal cases; the
constitutionally required roles of the judge and jury in crimi-
nal cases; and further interpretation of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.1
FOURTH AMENDMENT
In a 6-3 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the
Court in United States v. Drayton,2 holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus pas-
sengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse to consent
to a search.  Further, merely boarding a bus and questioning
passengers does not result in a seizure nor is a passenger’s con-
sent to search made involuntary.   The Court explained, “Law
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching
individuals on the street or in other public places and putting
questions to them if they are willing to listen.”  A person is not
seized as long as “a reasonable person would feel free to termi-
nate the encounter.”  The Court cited Florida v. Bostick,3 which
“addressed the specific question of drug interdiction efforts on
buses.”  In that case, the Court clarified here, “for the most
part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment
context,” which requires instead “a consideration of ‘all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the encounter.’”  The confinement a
bus passenger feels is “the natural result of choosing to take
the bus,” and is not related to police conduct.  Regarding the
encounter between police officers and bus passengers in the
present case, the Court asserted, “It is beyond question that
had this encounter occurred on the street, it would be consti-
tutional.  The fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does
not on its own transform standard police questioning of citi-
zens into an illegal seizure.”  Instead, the Court suggested,
“bus passengers answer officers’ questions and otherwise
cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers
know that their participation enhances their own safety and
the safety of those around them.”  Ultimately, the Court
explained that it “has rejected in specific terms the suggestion
that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to
refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless con-
sent search.”  Instead, it “has repeated that the totality of the
circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to the
absence of this type of warning.”  
In United States v. Arvizu,4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that an appropriate application
of the totality of circumstances test considers facts collec-
tively, rather than in isolation, and gives due weight to the fac-
tual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer.  In this
case, facts including a minivan’s travel on a primitive,
unpaved road typically used to circumvent a border patrol
checkpoint, at a time when the area is typically unpatrolled,
the driver’s stiff and rigid posture as he approached the border
patrol agent, and the subsequent “abnormal” behavior of the
child passengers “sufficed to form a particularized and objec-
tive basis for [the agent’s] stopping the vehicle, making the
stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”  The Court explained that reasonable suspicion
is determined on a case-by-case consideration of the totality of
the circumstances, which consequently “allows officers to
draw on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that ‘might well elude an
untrained person.’”  The Court suggested that “it is quite rea-
sonable that a driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture,
and failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer
might well be unremarkable in one instance (such as a busy
San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such
as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”
Accordingly, the officer’s “assessment of respondent’s reactions
upon seeing him and the children’s mechanical-like waving,
which continued for a full four to five minutes, were entitled
to some weight” and although “the facts suggested a family in
a minivan on a holiday outing[, a] determination that reason-
able suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct.”   
Recent Criminal Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2001-2002 Term
Charles H. Whitebread
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a unanimous
Court in United States v. Knights,5 holding a warrantless search
of a probationer’s apartment, supported by reasonable suspi-
cion and authorized by a condition of probation is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth
Amendment test of reasonableness balances “on the one hand,
the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy, and on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  The
Court explained, “Inherent in the very nature of probation is
that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled.’”  Therefore, “a court granting proba-
tion may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the
offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”
The Court also expressed its agreement with “‘the very
assumption of the institution of probation’. . . that the proba-
tioner ‘is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the
law.’”  Consequently, the Court concluded, “When an officer
has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search
condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough like-
lihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on
the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is
reasonable.”  
The Court addressed suspicionless drug testing of students
who participate in extracurricular activities in Board of
Education of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls.6 Justice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 majority,
held that the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by
the Tecumseh (Oklahoma) School District is a reasonable
means of furthering the school district’s interests and does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.  The Court reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment “imposes no irreducible requirement of
[individualized] suspicion,” within the frame of safety and
administrative regulations, so “a search unsupported by prob-
able cause may be reasonable when ‘special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and prob-
able-cause requirement impracticable.’”  The Court next dis-
cussed Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton7 in order to determine
what constitutes “special needs.”  The Court in Vernonia held
that “suspicionless drug testing of athletes was constitutional.”
The Court not only determined that “special needs” is inher-
ent in the public school context, but that “a finding of indi-
vidualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school con-
ducts drug testing.”  In order to conduct drug testing in
schools, the Court balanced “the intrusion on the children’s
Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”  The Court next uses the fact-specific
balancing approach in order to determine whether the policy
was constitutional.  The Court explained that although the stu-
dents in this situation are not athletes, as in Vernonia, “they
voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions
on their privacy as do athletes.”  Therefore, students have a
limited expectation of privacy.  The Court next suggested that
the procedure is more protective of the students’ privacy than
the procedure in Vernonia.  The Court concluded that the
“invasion of students’ privacy is not significant.”  Finally, the
Court considered “the nature and immediacy of the govern-
ment’s concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting
them.”  Noting the importance of preventing drug use by
schoolchildren, and the presence of drug use at the Tecumseh
schools, the Court asserted that the policy was reasonable and
there was no need to create a threshold test to be met before a
drug testing program would be allowed.  The Court stated that
“the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly
substantial for all children, athletes and nonathletes alike.”
Ultimately, by enacting the policy, the school district has cre-
ated a reasonably effective means of addressing its legitimate
concerns in “preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use.”  
FIFTH AMENDMENT
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in McKune v. Lile8 held that the
Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) provided to con-
victed sex offenders in Kansas serves a vital penological pur-
pose, and offering inmates minimal incentives to participate
does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited
by the Fifth Amendment. The SATP lasts for 18 months and
involves daily counseling.  Inmates address “sexual addiction;
understand the thoughts, feelings, and behavior dynamics that
precede their offenses; and develop relapse prevention skills.”
In order to take part in this program, respondent was required
to complete and sign a form, committing to discuss and accept
responsibility for the crime for which he has been sentenced.
A sexual history form that details prior sexual activities was
also required, regardless of whether these activities constitute
uncharged criminal offenses.  Although the information
obtained for the SATP is not privileged, it does advance the
rehabilitative goals of the program.  Kansas may use new evi-
dence obtained from this process against sex offenders in
future criminal proceedings, as Kansas law requires uncharged
sexual offenses involving minors to be reported to law enforce-
ment authority.  Justice Kennedy, in a plurality opinion for four
justices, began his analysis by discussing the impact of sex
offenders on the nation.  He noted that once convicted sex
offenders reenter society, they are more likely than any other
type of offender to be rearrested for a new sexual assault or
rape.  The state, therefore, has a “vital interest in rehabilitating
convicted sex offenders.”  The clinical rehabilitative programs
can be successful in reducing recidivism, and confronting one’s
past and accepting responsibility for one’s actions is an impor-
tant part of that rehabilitation.  Justice Kennedy opined that
the program does not create a compulsion for the inmates to
incriminate themselves since the consequences are not severe
enough to compel a prisoner to speak about past crimes
despite a desire to remain silent.  This is partly due to the fact
that these consequences are imposed on prisoners instead of
regular citizens.  Justice Kennedy pointed out that respondent’s
decision not to participate in SATP did not result in either an
Spring 2002 - Court Review 27
9. 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002).
10. 122 S.Ct. 1043 (2002).
11. 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002).
extension of his term of incarceration, or in his eligibility for
good-time credits or parole.  Citing prior decisions, Kennedy
concluded that “the government need not make the exercise of
the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.”  Justice O’Connor
concurred in the judgment, concluding that “the alterations in
respondent’s prison conditions as a result of his failure to par-
ticipate in [SATP] were [not] so great as to constitute compul-
sion” under the Fifth Amendment.
DUE PROCESS
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court in United
States v. Ruiz,9 holding that the Constitution does not require
the government to disclose material impeachment evidence
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.
The Court evaluated the lawfulness of a “fast track” plea bar-
gain process used by federal prosecutors in southern
California.  The fast-track plea bargain offer “asks a defendant
to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal [and] in return, the
government agrees to recommend to the sentencing judge a
two-level departure downward from the otherwise applicable
United States Sentencing Guidelines sentence.”  The Court
acknowledged that “a federal criminal defendant’s waiver of
the right to receive from prosecutors exculpatory impeach-
ment material [is] a right that the Constitution provides as part
of its basic ‘fair trial’ guarantee.”  However, “[w]hen a defen-
dant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair
trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees,”
such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as well as the right to confront one’s accusers and right to
a jury trial both provided by the Sixth Amendment.”  Although
it recognized that “the more information the defendant has,
the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea,
waiver, or decision and the wiser that decision will likely be,”
the Court held that “the Constitution does not require the
prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant.”
Instead, “the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intel-
ligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully under-
stands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in
general in the circumstances—even though the defendant may
not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”
Often, the usefulness of impeachment information “will
depend upon the defendant’s own independent knowledge of
the prosecution’s potential case—a matter that the constitution
does not require prosecutors to disclose.”  A right to pre-guilty
plea disclosure of impeachment information does not exist.
Such an additional safeguard not only has limited value, but
“could seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in
securing those guilty pleas that are factually justified, desired
by defendants, and help to secure the efficient administration
of justice.”  
In United States v. Vonn,10 Justice Souter delivered the opin-
ion of the Court, holding that a defendant who fails to make a
timely objection to a trial judge’s variance from the procedures
required before accepting a guilty plea, as specified in Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has the burden to
satisfy the plain-error rule on appeal.  Further, “a reviewing
court may consult the whole record when considering the
effect of any error on substantial rights.”  According to Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[t]he
Government avoids reversal of a criminal conviction by show-
ing that trial error, albeit raised by a timely objection, affected
no substantial right of the defendant and was thus harmless.”
However, if a defendant fails to make a timely objection, Rule
52(b) allows that defendant to “nonetheless obtain reversal of
a conviction by carrying the converse burden, showing among
other things that plain error did affect his substantial rights.”
Rule 11(h), which tracks Rule 52(a), “is a separate harmless-
error rule applying only to errors committed under Rule 11,
the rule meant to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and vol-
untary, by laying out the steps a trial judge must take before
accepting such a plea.”  There is no comparable plain error
rule, like that in Rule 52(b) in Rule 11(h).  The Court cited
Congress’s Advisory Committee Notes, which explain that “by
1983 the practice of automatic reversal for error threatening
little prejudice to a defendant or disgrace to the legal system
prompted further revision of Rule 11.”  Accordingly the harm-
less-error provision was added to Rule 11 because “[t]he com-
mittee said it was responding to the claim that the harmless-
error rule [of 52(a)] did not apply . . . [and] having pinpointed
that problem, it gave a pinpoint answer.”  Consequently, it is
likely that Congress’s omission from Rule 11 of a plain-error
rule did not show its intention to exclude its applicability.  The
Court maintained that if silent defendants were free from the
burden of plain-error review, “[a] defendant could simply relax
and wait to see if the sentence later struck him as satisfactory;
if not, his Rule 11 silence would have left him with clear but
uncorrected Rule 11 error to place on the Government’s shoul-
ders.”  Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, suggested, “It is . . .
perverse to place the burden on the uninformed defendant to
object to deviations from Rule 11 or to establish prejudice aris-
ing out of the judge’s failure to mention a right that he does not
know he has.”  
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In Alabama v. Shelton,11 the Court held in a 5-4 decision that
the Sixth Amendment prevented imposition of a suspended
sentence that may end up in the actual deprivation of a per-
son’s liberty if the defendant was not accorded the “guiding
hand of counsel” in the prosecution for the crime charged.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, emphasized that the
Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis follows the “actual impris-
onment standard,” which forbids imprisonment for any
offense of a person who was not represented by counsel at trial,
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver. Because suspended
sentences are prison terms imposed for the offense of convic-
tion, when the prison term is triggered the defendant is incar-
cerated for the underlying offense rather than for a probation
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violation. Such actual imprisonment for uncounseled convic-
tions falls squarely within the Sixth Amendment’s prohibition.
The Court further indicated that the Constitution also bars
imposition of a suspended sentence that can never be enforced.
Justice Scalia, writing for the four dissenting justices, insisted
that actual imprisonment is the “touchstone of entitlement to
appointed counsel” and accused the majority of extending the
misdemeanor right to counsel “to cases bearing the mere threat
of imprisonment.” Thus, the dissent contended that suspended
sentences clearly do not invoke a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
In Mickens v. Taylor,12 the Court addressed the Sixth
Amendment right to conflict-free representation in a murder
trial. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation of
the right to counsel where a trial court failed to inquire into a
potential conflict of interest about which it reasonably should
have known, petitioner must “establish that the conflict of
interest affected his counsel’s performance” in order to void the
conviction. Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
mandates counsel that is effective in preserving the right to a
fair trial, defects in assistance that have no probable effect
upon the trial’s outcome do not establish a constitutional vio-
lation. The Court found that petitioner failed to demonstrate
in this case that counsel’s brief court-appointed representation
the previous week of the murder victim whom petitioner was
accused of killing affected his representation in the murder
trial. The highly fractured dissenting opinions (Justices
Stevens and Souter dissented separately and Justice Breyer
wrote in dissent for himself and Justice Ginsburg) appear to
agree that various categorical rules would be appropriate. They
disagreed whether these rules should free petitioners from
showing prejudice in cases of apparent unfairness or impose
upon the court a duty to enquire into potential conflicts of
interest about which it should know.
In an 8-1 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court in Bell v. Cone,13 held  that a defense counsel’s failure to
present any mitigating evidence or make a closing argument at
a capital sentencing proceeding was not ineffective assistance
of counsel, but instead a tactical trial decision.  Rehnquist
relied upon Strickland v. Washington,14 which “announced a
two-part test for evaluating claims that a defendant’s counsel
performed so incompetently in his or her representation of a
defendant that the defendant’s sentence or conviction should
be reversed.”  To satisfy this test, the defendant must prove
“both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense,”
which would then indicate that “counsel’s assistance was
defective enough to undermine confidence in a proceeding’s
result.”  As it did in Strickland, the Court emphasized that
“‘[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential’ and that ‘every effort [must] be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight.’”  Consequently, “a defen-
dant must overcome the ‘presumption that, under the circum-
stances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy.’”  The Court recognized counsel’s “formidable task of
defending a client who had committed a horribly brutal and
senseless crime against two elderly persons in their home.”
Although the Court suggests that there were alternatives to the
attorney’s decision not to reemphasize respondent’s mental dis-
ease and drug addiction, his decision not to call or recall wit-
nesses, and his waiver of a closing argument, the Court con-
cluded that none of the alternatives “so clearly outweighs the
other that it was objectively unreasonable to . . . deem coun-
sel’s choice . . . a tactical decision about which competent
lawyers might disagree.”  
EIGHTH AMENDMENT – 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In Hope v. Pelzer,15 the Court held 6-3 that handcuffing an
inmate to a hitching post or similar stationary object for a
length of time in excess of that necessary to quell a threat or
restore order is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the Court, said that any safety concerns had abated by
the time petitioner Hope was handcuffed to the hitching post
since he had already been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg
irons, and transported back to the prison. The Court also
found the practice was punitive and created a substantial risk
of harm of which the officers were aware. The officials acted
with “deliberate indifference to the inmates’ health or safety”
since the “risk of harm [was] obvious.” The officers involved
were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judg-
ment phase since Supreme Court precedent, a Justice
Department report, and Eleventh Circuit precedent gave a rea-
sonable officer “fair and clear warning” that handcuffing Hope
to a hitching post in these circumstances was unlawful. 
DEATH PENALTY AND APPRENDI
In a 6-3 decision, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in
Atkins v. Virginia,16 held that in light of the nation’s “evolving
standards of decency,” the execution of the mentally retarded
“is excessive and . . . the Constitution ‘places a substantive
restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally
retarded offender.”  Although “those mentally retarded persons
who meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility
should be tried and punished when they commit crimes,” the
Court said that due to their disabilities “they do not act with
the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most seri-
ous adult criminal conduct.”  Consequently, their “impair-
ments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital pro-
ceedings against” them.  The Court clarified that “the Eighth
Amendment succinctly prohibits ‘excessive’ sanctions” and
that “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to the offense.”  The Court
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began its analysis by explaining that “the basic concept under-
lying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man . . . [and therefore t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”  In identifying these standards,
the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contem-
porary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legis-
latures.”  However, the Court concluded that “the Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”  As an indica-
tion of the national consensus, the Court identified 18 states,
as well as the federal government, all having enacted legisla-
tion exempting mentally retarded offenders from execution: “It
is not so much the number of these States that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change.”  Consequently,
this “provides powerful evidence that today society views men-
tally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.”  In order to substantiate its support of this
“legislative consensus,” the Court urged that since the death
penalty has been reserved for “the most serious crimes . . . the
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does
not merit that form of retribution.”  Moreover, the same
impairments that exculpate mentally retarded offenders “also
make it less likely that they can process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control
their conduct based upon that information.”  
In Justice Scalia’s lengthy dissent, he criticized the lack of
support for the Court’s decision and exclaimed, “Seldom has
an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but
the personal views of its members.”  He argued that “the arro-
gance of [the Court’s] assumption of power takes one’s breath
away.”  Scalia suggested that “it will rarely if ever be the case
that the Members of this Court will have a better sense of the
evolution in views of the American people than do their
elected representatives.”  Revealing that the oldest of the
Court’s cited statutes is 14 years old, Scalia warned that
“reliance upon ‘trends,’ even those of much longer duration
than a mere 14 years, is a perilous basis for constitutional adju-
dication.”  He concluded, “As long as a mentally retarded
offender knows ‘the difference between right and wrong’ . . .
only the sentencer can assess whether his retardation reduces
his culpability enough to exempt him from the death penalty
for the particular murder in question.”  
In Kelly v. South Carolina,17 Justice Souter delivered the
opinion of the Court, which held 5-4 that when the only alter-
natives a jury is allowed to consider are death or life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole, due process requires
that a jury be clearly informed of the defendant’s parole ineli-
gibility. The decision was in keeping with the Court’s decision
in Simmons v. South Carolina,18 which held that the jury must
be informed of life incarceration without possibility of parole
as an alternative to the death penalty. The state court had held
Simmons inapplicable since the state’s statutes provide a pos-
sible sentence of 30 years instead of life without parole.  The
Court rejected that argument with a reference to Shafer v.
South Carolina,19 which had explained that “under the South
Carolina sentencing scheme a jury now makes a sentencing
recommendation only if the jurors find the existence of an
aggravating circumstance such as a finding of potential future
dangerousness.  When they do make a recommendation, their
only alternatives are death or life without parole.”
Responding to the state’s first point that the state supreme
court found Kelly’s future dangerousness not at issue in the
trial, the Court considered this finding “unsupportable on the
record before us.”   The Court’s final discussion was a reitera-
tion of the need to inform the jury of South Carolina’s sen-
tencing scheme due to reasonable assumption that jurors may
not be sufficiently informed about the impossibility of parole.
The Court concluded that although “[t]he State stresses that
the judge told the jury that the terms ‘life imprisonment’ and
‘death sentence’ should be understood in their plain and ordi-
nary meanings, . . . [w]e found these statements inadequate to
convey a clear understanding of Shafer’s parole ineligibility
and Kelly, no less than Shafer was entitled to his requested
jury instruction.”  
In Ring v. Arizona,20 the Court revisited its decision uphold-
ing an Arizona sentencing statute in Walton v. Arizona.21 The
Court set out to determine Walton’s validity in light of the rea-
soning in Apprendi v. New Jersey.22 In a 7-2 decision, Justice
Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that
Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable.  Overruling Walton, the
Court concluded that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury
is prohibited from finding an aggravating circumstance neces-
sary for the imposition of the death penalty and since
“Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the func-
tional equivalent of an element of a greater offense’ the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”  The Walton
Court accepted that the aggravating factors in Arizona’s sen-
tencing scheme were not “elements of the offense,” but rather
“ranked as ‘sentencing considerations’ guiding the choice
between life and death.”  It therefore could not “conclude that
a State is required to denominate aggravating circumstances
‘elements’ of the offense or permit only a jury to determine the
existence of such circumstances.”  Ten years later, in Apprendi,
the Court “held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a
defendant to be ‘expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the max-
imum he would receive in the jury verdict alone.”  Attempting
to reconcile its decision with Walton, the Apprendi Court
focused on “[t]he key distinction . . . that a conviction of first-
degree murder in Arizona carried a maximum sentence of
death.” For this reason, “[o]nce a jury has found the defendant
guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its max-
imum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge
to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser
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one, ought to be imposed.”  However, the Court now recog-
nizes that the Apprendi dissent more accurately described
Arizona’s sentencing scheme when it explained that a “[d]efen-
dant’s death sentence required the judge’s factual findings.”
Following “Apprendi’s instruction that ‘the relevant inquiry is
one not of form, but of effect,” the Court acknowledged, “In
effect, ‘the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance]
exposed [Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized
by the jury’s guilty verdict.”  As the Court said, “Apprendi
repeatedly instructs . . . that the characterization of a fact or
circumstance as an ‘element’ or a ‘sentencing factor’ is not
determinative of the question ‘who decides,’ judge or jury.”
Finally, the Court concluded, “Although ‘the doctrine of stare
decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law’ . . . our
precedents are not sacrosanct.”  Instead, the Court has “over-
ruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of
doing so has been established.”  
OTHER APPRENDI ISSUES
In United States v. Cotton,23 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that a federal indictment’s failure
to include an alleged drug quantity involved in a conspiracy,
which results in an enhanced statutory maximum sentence,
make the enhanced sentence erroneous under Apprendi v. New
Jersey,24 but that the “error did not seriously affect the fair-
ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,”
and therefore did not rise to the level of plain error to be cor-
rected by the appellate court.  According to the plain-error test
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), an appellate
court can correct an error not raised at trial if only if there is
an “error” that is “plain,” affects substantial rights, and “the
error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public repu-
tation of judicial proceedings.”  Even though the parties agree
that omitting the drug quantity from the indictment was an
error that was plain, and the Court assumes the error did
affect substantial rights, “the error did not seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings.”  The Court said that the “overwhelming” and “essen-
tially uncontroverted” evidence included numerous state
arrests and seizures, a federal search, and the trial testimony
of two cooperating co-conspirators and the Court ultimately
concluded, “Surely the grand jury, having found that the con-
spiracy existed, would have also found that the conspiracy
involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base.”  Ultimately, the
Court stressed, “the fairness and integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system depends on meting out to those inflicting the
greatest harm on society the most severe punishments.”
Therefore, “The real threat . . . to the ‘fairness, integrity, and
public reputation of judicial proceedings’ would be if respon-
dents, despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence
that they were involved in a vast drug conspiracy, were to
receive a sentence prescribed for those committing less sub-
stantial drug offenses because of an error that was never
objected to at trial.”
The Court in Harris v. United States,25 set out to determine
whether or not brandishing a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§924(c)(1)(A) is a sentencing factor or an element of a sepa-
rate crime and to identify the validity of McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,26 after the Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.27 In McMillan, the Court had “sustained a statute that
increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not
beyond the statutory maximum, when the sentencing judge
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
had possessed a firearm.”  In Apprendi, the Court held that
“other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum . . . must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  In the present case, Justice
Kennedy writing for a 5-4 majority held, “as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, §924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense . . .
[and] regards brandishing and discharging as sentencing fac-
tors to be found by the judge, not offense elements to be found
by the jury.”  Then, writing for a four-member plurality (not
joined by Justice Breyer, who helped to form the five-member
majority), Justice Kennedy tried to reconcile McMillan and
Apprendi:  “Read together McMillan and Apprendi mean that
those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the
judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for
the purposes of the constitutional analysis,” and judicial dis-
cretion within the range authorized by the jury verdict may be
narrowed “by requiring defendants to serve minimum terms
after judges make certain factual findings.”  Justice Breyer
refused to join the plurality in reconciling McMillan and
Apprendi, but nonetheless agreed that Apprendi did not apply to
mandatory minimum sentences.
Justice Kennedy began his analysis in Harris by stating,
“Federal laws usually list all offense elements ‘in a single sen-
tence’ and separate the sentencing factors ‘into subsections.’”
In §924(c)(1)(A), the initial paragraph lists the elements of a
complete crime, but “toward the end of the paragraph is the
word ‘shall,’ which often divides offense-defining provisions
from those that specify sentences.”  Separate subsections fol-
low the word “shall” and incrementally increase the minimum
penalty, yet do not repeat the elements stated in the principal
paragraph.  Based on this structure, Kennedy feels confident in
“presum[ing] that its principal paragraph defines a single
crime and its subsections identify sentencing factors.”  Further,
“[t]he incremental changes in the minimum—from 5 years, to
7, to 10—are precisely what one would expect to see in provi-
sions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s con-
sideration.”  Although sentencing factors “cannot swell the
penalty above what the law has provided for the acts charged
against the prisoner,” Kennedy observed, “[a]t issue in
Apprendi, by contrast was a sentencing factor that did ‘swell the
penalty above what the law has provided,’. . . and thus func-
tioned more like a ‘traditional element.’”  The Apprendi Court
“made clear that its holding did not affect McMillan at all: ‘We
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do not overrule McMillan.  We limit its holding to cases that do
not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the
statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s
verdict—a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion
itself.’”  Kennedy emphasized, “The judge may impose the
minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the
range without seeking further authorization from those
juries—and without contradicting Apprendi.”  
Justice Thomas, writing for the four dissenting justices in
Harris, said that “McMillan . . . conflicts with the Court’s later
decision in Apprendi,” and, he suggested, “[t]he Court’s hold-
ing today therefore rests on either a misunderstanding or a
rejection of the very principles that animated Apprendi just two
years ago.”  He stressed, “As a matter of common sense, an
increased mandatory minimum heightens the loss of liberty
and represents the increased stigma society attaches to the
offense.  Consequently, facts that trigger an increased manda-
tory minimum sentence warrant constitutional safeguards.”
Thomas contended that Apprendi stood for the principle that
“when a fact exposes a defendant to greater punishment than
what is otherwise legally prescribed, that fact is ‘by definition
[an] element of a separate legal offense.’”  Thus, “there are no
logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory mini-
mums any differently than facts that increase the statutory
maximum.”  
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In another 5-4 decision, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion
of the Court in Carey v. Saffold,28 holding that under
§2244(d)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the term “pending” covers the time
between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a notice
of appeal to a higher state court, an interval during which the
time period for seeking federal habeas corpus relief is tolled.
Relying on the dictionary definition of the word “pending” the
Court determines that it means “through the period of contin-
uance . . . of” or “until the . . . completion of.”  The Court
therefore concluded that “until the application has achieved
final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures,
by definition it remains ‘pending.’”  In Justice Kennedy’s dis-
sent, he criticized the Court’s assertion “that an application is
pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process
is ‘in continuance,’” because “that is only true, of course, if
‘application’ means the ‘ordinary state collateral review
process,’ a proposition that finds no support” in the dictionary.
He argued that when the word “application” is used in the laws
governing federal habeas corpus, “it is clear that the statute
refers to a specific legal document.”  However, he contended
that the Court’s holding “gives ‘application’ a new meaning
. . . that embraces the multiple petitions, appeals, and other fil-
ings that constitute the ‘ordinary state collateral review
process.’”  
In a 6-3 decision, Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of
the Court in Lee v. Kemna,29 holding that the failure to comply
with state rules stipulating the requirements for continuance
motions, in extraordinary cases, does not constitute state
grounds adequate to bar federal habeas review.  Generally, the
Court “will not take up a question of federal law presented in a
case ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law
ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate
to support the judgment . . . whether the state-law ground is
substantive or procedural.’”  However, “there are . . . exceptional
cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule
renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a
federal question.”  In this case, the Court found that noncom-
pliance with Missouri Supreme Court Rules 24.09 and 24.10,
which designate requirements for continuance motions, did not
procedurally default petitioner’s claim.  Focusing specifically on
Rule 24.10, the Court acknowledged that it, “like other state
and federal rules of its genre, serves a governmental interest of
undoubted legitimacy . . . designed to arm trial judges with the
information needed to rule reliably on a motion to delay a
scheduled criminal trial.” But in this case “the Rule’s essential
requirements . . . were substantially met.”  In Justice Kennedy’s
dissent, he argued that “[a]lmost every case presents unique cir-
cumstances that cannot be foreseen and articulated by prior
decisions, and general rules like Rule 24.10 are designed to
eliminate second-guessing about the rule’s applicability in spe-
cial cases.”  Moreover, “[a]ll requirements of a rule are, in the
rulemaker’s view, essential to fulfill its purposes; imperfect com-
pliance is thus, by definition, not compliance at all.”  
In Horn v. Banks,30 the Court addressed the necessity of
undertaking the analysis identified in Teague v. Lane31 in a hear-
ing for federal habeas corpus relief when the state properly
raises the issue. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that
the inquiries in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) and Teague are distinct, and that the threshold
question in every habeas case is whether the court is obligated
to apply the Teague rule to the defendant’s claim. The Teague
Court had explained that new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases that have
become final before the new rules are announced, unless they
fall within an exception to the general rule. After respondent
Banks’s first-degree murder conviction had been directly
appealed, the Supreme Court decided a case that he claimed
applied to his conviction. Because the government raised the
question of retroactivity in the district and intermediate appel-
late court, the Court must apply the Teague analysis before con-
sidering the merits of the claim. The Court stressed that the
Teague analysis is distinct from AEDPA standards of review and
continues in force independent of, and subsequent to, the pas-
sage of the AEDPA. Thus, in addition to performing any analy-
sis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas
petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the
issue is properly raised by the state.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for an 8-1 majority in Bell
v. Cone,32 held a federal habeas petition challenging specific
aspects of an attorney’s representation is governed by
Strickland v. Washington33 and survives only if the petitioner
proves that the state court’s decision is either “contrary to” or
involves “an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).  The Court began
by explaining that a federal writ may be issued “under the ‘con-
trary to’ clause if the state court applies a rule different from
the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case
differently than we have done on a set of materially indistin-
guishable facts.”  Alternatively, a writ may be issued “under the
‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state court correctly
identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.”  The
Court stressed that “an unreasonable application is different
from an incorrect one.”  Respondent in this case argued that
his ineffective assistance claim was governed by United States
v. Cronic,34 which “identified three situations implicating the
right to counsel that involved circumstances ‘so likely to prej-
udice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a par-
ticular case is unjustified.’”  The three situations were: a “com-
plete denial of counsel” at a “critical stage”; where “counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing”; and “where counsel is called upon to ren-
der assistance under circumstances where competent counsel
very likely could not.”  Respondent only claims that by
“fail[ing] to ‘mount some case for life’ after the prosecution
introduced evidence in the sentencing hearing and gave a clos-
ing statement,” his attorney failed to subject prosecution’s case
to meaningful adversarial testing at the sentencing phase and
therefore prejudice should have been presumed.  However, the
Court explained that in Cronic it used the word “entirely” to
indicate “that the attorney’s failure must be complete.”
Respondent fails to make this showing since he does not argue
“that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout
the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel
failed to do so at specific points.” The Court said that the attor-
ney’s failure in this case to adduce mitigating evidence at sen-
tencing and his waiver of a closing argument “are of the same
ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to
Strickland’s performance and prejudice components.”
Ultimately, the Court also concluded that the state court’s
application of Strickland was not an “unreasonable” one when
it determined that the defense counsel’s “performance was
within the permissible range of competency.”  
CONCLUSION
Although the Court’s death penalty cases have received the
most publicity, their significance for the future pails in com-
parison to the practical effect of the Court’s decisions regarding
assistance of counsel in minor criminal cases and the increased
deference afforded law enforcement officers in making
searches and seizures.  Also, the Court’s decisions clarifying
and solidifying Apprendi v. New Jersey will undoubtedly have
far-reaching influence on how routine criminal cases are con-
ducted.  While the 5-4 ideological split remains an ever-present
feature of this Supreme Court, many more significant decisions
than last term, specifically in the Fourth Amendment context,
seem to be less susceptible of change as a result of any Court
appointments that may take place in the near future.  This is
not only due to the more unified appearance of the Court at
times, but also to the atypical divisions in numerous cases.  
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The United States Supreme Court’s 2001-2002 term markedChief Justice Rehnquist’s 30th anniversary on the bench.Given the continuing prominence of 5-4 splits along typ-
ically ideological lines, the chief justice’s leadership is as sig-
nificant as it ever was.  In the context of the Court’s civil deci-
sions, the chief justice’s importance to the conservative bloc
was demonstrated in the case immunizing states from private-
party complaints adjudicated by administrative agencies and in
the Court’s acceptance of a policy permitting public vouchers
to be used for religious school tuition.  The Court also con-
fronted significant issues regarding the First Amendment and
limitations on protecting children from pornography; regula-
tion of HMOs; student privacy; and, possibly most noteworthy,
the applicability and limitations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.1
FIRST AMENDMENT – SPEECH
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,2 Justice Kennedy deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, holding sections 2256(8)(B)
and 2256(8)(D) of the 1996 Child Pornography Prevention
Act overbroad and beyond remedy in their infringement on
lawful speech protected by the First Amendment.  The Court
found Section 2256(8)(B), which encompasses any Hollywood
movies, filmed with adult actors if the jury believes an actor
“appears to be” a minor engaging in “actual or simulated . . .
sexual intercourse,” in violation of a fundamental First
Amendment rule—simply, that “[t]he artistic merit of a work
does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene.”
Section 2256(8)(D) altogether prohibits computer-generated
images of fictitious children as well as any sexually explicit
image that is “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” it
depicts “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”  The
Court examined this section in comparison to New York v.
Ferber,3 and in this light the Court finds a crucial distinction:
computer-generated images create no victims, which is in
direct contrast to the content at issue in Ferber. Ferber specifi-
cally said that “[i]f it were necessary for literary or artistic
value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked
younger could be utilized.”  The Court reasoned, “Ferber,
then, not only referred to the distinction between actual and
virtual child pornography, it relied on it as a reason supporting
its holding.”  To the secondary assertion of the government
that virtual images “are indistinguishable from real ones [and]
. . . are part of the same market” and so contribute to the
exploitation of real children, the Court found this reasoning
implausible due to the belief that few pornographers would
risk such severe penalties if computerized alternatives would
be sufficient to satisfy the market force.  Finally, to the govern-
ment assertion that technology could make it more difficult for
the prosecution of real child pornographers, the Court
responded, “This analysis turns the First Amendment upside
down. The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the
means to suppress unlawful speech. The Constitution requires
the reverse.”
In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,4 Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that “reliance
on community standards to identify ‘material that is harmful to
minors’ does not by itself render the statute substantially over-
broad for purposes of the First Amendment.” The Court
deemed Congress’ effort to protect children from adult Internet
content via the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) not to be
overbroad in its definition of prohibited content or its evalua-
tion of such content according to “community” standards. The
Court’s ruling stood first on the distinctions between COPA
and its unconstitutional forerunner the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).  COPA represents a more limited
ban compared to the CDA in three ways: COPA applies only to
material displayed on the web, it covers only communications
made for commercial purposes, and it prohibits “material that
is harmful to minors” instead of the CDA’s prohibition of
“indecent” and “patently offensive” communications.  The
Court fashioned its definition of “material that is harmful to
minors” around its three-part test of obscene material in Miller
v. California.5 The Court subsequently addressed the lower
court’s concerns about the excessive burden of varying com-
munity standards by reasoning that a juror, regardless of
instruction, will surely apply a personal knowledge of obscen-
ity that will be, in part, a product of his geographic area.  To
buttress its position, the Court referred to its rulings in
Hamling v. United States6 and Sable Communications of
California, Inc.  v. FCC7 and concluded that “this Court’s
jurisprudence teaches that it is the publisher’s responsibility to
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abide by that community’s standards.  The publisher’s burden
does not change simply because it decides to distribute its
material to every community in the Nation.”
In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,8 a 5-4 decision,
Justice O’Connor wrote for a four-member plurality, upholding
against facial challenge on a summary judgment motion a city
ordinance prohibiting two adult-content operations tradition-
ally existing in the same building and operated by the same
enterprise.  Her opinion concluded that the ordinance served a
substantial government interest and did not constitute a con-
tent-based restriction of protected speech since the ordinance
was supported by a study conducted by the municipality sev-
eral years before the ordinance was enacted.  Justice O’Connor
specifically upheld the ordinance based on the three-part crite-
ria set forth in Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc.9 The first of three
criteria in Renton—that the ordinance be capable of construc-
tion as a proper time, place, and manner regulation—was con-
sidered to be satisfied because the ordinance did not ban, but
only required relocation of establishments.  The second crite-
rion in Renton—whether the ordinance is content neutral or
content based—was satisfied, for purposes of summary judg-
ment, by the city’s prior study demonstrating adverse sec-
ondary effects from concentrations of adult businesses.  The
third criterion  in Renton—that the ordinance reflect a sub-
stantial government interest “and that reasonable alternative
avenues of communication remain available”—also was satis-
fied for purposes of summary judgment by the city’s prior
study.  In opposition to the Court of Appeals analysis of the
third step in the Renton criteria, the plurality found that the
1977 study relied upon by the city successfully demonstrated
that crime patterns were influenced by the number of adult
entertainment establishments, and therefore satisfied the
requirement in providing a substantial government interest in
the city’s attempts to reduce crime.  The plurality specifically
addressed the amount of evidence that the city must present to
justify such an ordinance under Renton.  If the Court accepted
the arguments of respondents, the plurality opinion con-
cluded, then “it would effectively require that the city provide
evidence that not only supports the claim its ordinance serves
an important government interest, but also does not provide
support for any other approach.  In Renton, we specifically
refused to set such a high bar.”  Justice Kennedy provided a
fifth vote in favor of upholding the city’s ordinance at the sum-
mary judgment stage, but did not join the plurality opinion.
He emphasized that the Court’s decision in Alameda Books
should not be read to expand the rules found in Renton, but
agreed that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the ordi-
nance at the summary judgment stage.
The Court considered the issue of judicial candidates
announcing their views on legal or political issues in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.10 In a 5-4 decision,
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and held that the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon of judicial conduct that pro-
hibits a judicial candidate from “announc[ing] his or her views
on disputed legal or political issues” violates the First
Amendment.  Minnesota’s process for the selection of state
judges is a nonpartisan popular election.  Since 1974, the
“announce clause” has been in effect, creating a legal restric-
tion that a “candidate for a judicial office, including an incum-
bent judge,” shall not “announce his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues.”  The Court began its analysis by not-
ing that the prohibition on announcing applies to the candi-
date’s statement of his current position, even if that is not
maintained after election.  The Court recognized there are lim-
itations that the Minnesota Supreme Court placed upon the
scope of the clause.  The Court next determined whether a list
of preapproved subjects that the judicial candidates may speak
about adequately fulfills the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of speech.  Since the announce clause prohibits
speech on the basis of its content, the Court used strict
scrutiny to resolve its constitutionality.  Strict scrutiny requires
that the respondents prove that the announce clause is nar-
rowly tailored and that it serves a compelling state interest.  To
demonstrate that the clause is narrowly tailored, the respon-
dents must show that it does not “unnecessarily circumscribe
protected expression.”  The Court noted that respondents
claimed two interests as “sufficiently compelling to justify the
announce clause: preserving the impartiality of the state judi-
ciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the
state judiciary.”  These interests do not meet strict scrutiny,
according to the Court.  The Court concluded its decision by
identifying an “obvious tension between the article of
Minnesota’s popularly approved Constitution which provides
that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s announce clause which places most subjects of interest
to the voters off limits.”  However, the Court said that the First
Amendment does not allow elections to occur while at the
same time “preventing candidates from discussing what the
elections are about.”
In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,11 the Court
held in a 5-4 decision that the prohibitions in the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) on
soliciting prescriptions for, and advertising, compounded
drugs amount to unconstitutional restrictions on commercial
speech.  The FDAMA exempts “compounded drugs” from the
Food and Drug Administration’s standard drug approval
requirements as long as several restrictions, including a prohi-
bition on advertising or promoting compound drugs, are met.
Drug compounding is mixing or altering ingredients to create
a medication tailored to the needs of a particular patient.  The
Court began its analysis by pointing out that although com-
mercial speech receives First Amendment protection, not all
regulation of commercial speech is unconstitutional.  In
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y.,12 the Court created a test to determine permissible regu-
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lation of commercial speech.  First, the test asks whether the
commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is mislead-
ing.  If so, then it is not protected by the First Amendment.  If
it is lawful activity that is not misleading, however, the next
step is to determine “whether the asserted governmental inter-
est is substantial.”  If it is, then the third step is to “determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interests asserted,” and last, “whether it is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.”  All of the last three
inquiries must be answered in the affirmative in order for the
regulation to be found constitutional.  The Court then applied
this test and noted that the government did not argue the first
prong of Central Hudson.  The Court recognized that the next
prong is met:  “Preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the
. . . drug approval process is clearly an important governmen-
tal interest.”  For the third prong, the Court assumed arguendo
that the prohibition on advertising “might” directly advance
the governmental interest.  The court held, however, that the
government failed the last step of the test, to “demonstrate that
the speech restrictions are ‘not more extensive than necessary
to serve [those] interests.’”  Accordingly, the regulation cannot
be found constitutional.  The Court said, “If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech
must be a last—not first—resort.  Yet here it seems to have
been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”  Finally,
the Court concluded that the advertising prohibitions were
overbroad as they would “affect pharmacists other than those
interested in producing drugs on a large scale.”
In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v.
Village of Stratton,13 the Court addressed an ordinance regulat-
ing the activities of solicitors and canvassers.  The six-justice
majority held that an ordinance that requires individuals to
obtain a permit prior to engaging in door-to-door advocacy
and to display the permit upon demand violates the First
Amendment.  The ordinance at issue provided that any can-
vasser who intends to go on private property must obtain a
“solicitation permit” from the office of the mayor if they intend
to promote a cause.  The ordinance itself lays out the grounds
for denying or revoking a permit, although there was no evi-
dence that any permit had been denied or revoked.  Petitioner,
a society that coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, never applied for a permit on the grounds that their
authority to preach stems from scripture and that seeking a
permit would cause the petitioners to feel as though they were
insulting God.  The Court began its analysis by pointing out
that restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteer-
ing have been invalidated for over 50 years.  Since door-to-
door canvassing is mandated to Jehovah’s Witnesses through
their religion, most of the cases dealing with First Amendment
challenges to restrictions on door-to-door canvassing have
involved this religious group.  Through review of  these past
cases, the Court recognized that although the village’s interests
are legitimate, precedent makes it “clear that there must be a
balance between these interests and the effect of the regula-
tions on First Amendment rights.”  The interests put forth by
the village were the prevention of fraud, the prevention of
crime, and the protection of residents’ privacy.  However, the
Court said it must also look at the amount of speech covered
by the ordinances and at the balance “between the affected
speech and the governmental interests that the ordinance pur-
ports to serve.”  Since the ordinance applies to more than com-
mercial activities and solicitation of funds, the Court held it
was not narrowly tailored to the village’s interests.  The Court
identified the permit as a burden on some speech of citizens
holding religious or patriotic views, including those who will
not apply for a license because of their religious scruples as
well as those who would “prefer silence to speech licensed by
a petty official.”  The Court also noted that spontaneous
speech would be banned by the ordinance.  The Court con-
cluded its analysis by pointing out that although the “breadth
and unprecedented nature” of the regulation renders it invalid,
the regulation also is not tailored to the village’s stated inter-
ests, which additionally renders the regulation invalid.
Although the prevention of crime is a stated interest, the Court
found it unlikely that “the absence of a permit would preclude
criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversa-
tions not covered by the ordinance.”
FIRST AMENDMENT – ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris14
held that Ohio’s pilot school voucher program does not offend
the Establishment Clause as it is neutral with respect to reli-
gion and permits individuals to exercise genuine choice among
public and private, secular and religious options.  Ohio’s pro-
gram provides tuition aid for students to attend a participating
public or private school that their parents choose.  “Any pri-
vate school, whether religious or nonreligious, may participate
in the program and accept program students so long as the
school is located within the boundaries of a covered district
and meets statewide educational standards,” the Court
explained.  Among the 56 private schools participating in the
program, 46 (or 82%) are religiously affiliated.  Most of the
students participating in the program (96%) are enrolled in
religiously affiliated schools.  The Court began its analysis by
recognizing that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, “prevents a State from enacting laws that have
the ‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.”
Though the program has a valid secular purpose, the Court
must determine whether the effect of the program is to
advance or inhibit religion.  The Court said that in dealing
with this issue, its decisions have “drawn a consistent distinc-
tion between government programs that provide aid directly to
religious schools and programs of true private choice, in which
government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the
genuine and independent choices of private individuals.”   The
Court determined that the Ohio program is one of true private
choice and is neutral toward religion in all respects.  The Court
argued that there are no financial incentives that “skew the
program toward religious schools.”  Instead, the program cre-
ates disincentives for religious schools since magnet schools
and adjacent public schools receive significantly more money
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than private religious schools.  Finally, the Court refused to use
Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist15 as a
framework to decide the current case.  The Court in Nyquist
found that a New York program that gave benefits exclusively
to private schools and the parents of private school enrollees
was unconstitutional.  Although its purpose was secular, the
program’s function was to provide financial support for non-
public, sectarian institutions.  The Court concluded that
Nyquist does not apply to the Ohio case, in part because the
program in Nyquist provided incentives for students to attend
religious schools and prohibited the participation of public
schools.
FEDERALISM
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of
the Court in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina
State Ports Authority,16 holding that state sovereign immunity
bars the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), an executive
branch agency, from adjudicating complaints filed by a private
party’s complaint against a nonconsenting state.  The Eleventh
Amendment states, “The judicial Power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any
Foreign State.”  However, the Amendment “is but one particu-
lar exemplification of that immunity . . . [and the] Court has
repeatedly held that the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the
States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh
Amendment.”  Since “the Framers, who envisioned a limited
Federal Government, could not have anticipated the vast
growth of the administrative state,” the Court relied on the
presumption established in Hans v. Louisiana,17 where the
Court explained “that the Constitution was not intended to
‘raise up’ any proceedings against the States that were ‘anom-
alous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted.’”
Upon evaluating the FMC adjudications, the Court observed
that an administrative adjudication “walks, talks, and squawks
very much like a lawsuit,” and concluded that “the similarities
between FMC proceedings and civil litigation are overwhelm-
ing.”  “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity,”
the Court concluded, “is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”  Accordingly,
“if the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State’s
dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private par-
ties in federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would have
found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same
thing before the administrative tribunal of an agency, such as
the FMC.”  Furthermore, “it would be quite strange to prohibit
Congress from exercising its Article I powers to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in Article III judicial proceedings but per-
mit the use of those same Article I powers to create court-like
administrative tribunals where sovereign immunity does not
apply.”  Justice Breyer began his dissent, joined by three other
justices, by disputing the majority’s characterization of the
agency:  “[T]he Federal Maritime Commission, is an ‘indepen-
dent’ federal agency . . . [and therefore] belongs neither to the
Legislative Branch nor the Judicial Branch of Government.”
Moreover, “the Court [has] denied that [agency] activities as
safeguarded, however much they might resemble the activities
of a legislature or court, fell within the scope of Article I or
Article III of the Constitution.”  Finally, Justice Breyer antici-
pated that the Court’s decisions will lead to “less agency flexi-
bility, a larger federal bureaucracy, less fair procedure, and
potentially less effective law enforcement.”  
In Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia,18 Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Court, held
that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
removes a case from state court to federal court.  While the
Eleventh Amendment grants a state immunity from suit in fed-
eral court by citizens of other states as well as by its own citi-
zens, states remain free to waive that immunity.  The Court rea-
soned, “It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State
both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending
that the ‘Judicial power of the United States’ extends to the case
at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity,
thereby denying that the ‘Judicial power of the United States’
extends to the case at hand.”  Although a state, as in this case,
may be brought involuntarily into the state court as a defen-
dant, if it “then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to fed-
eral court . . . [then] it voluntarily invoked the federal court’s
jurisdiction.” The Court concluded that the voluntariness of
the state’s participation in federal court is what matters;
removal to federal court is a sufficiently “clear” indication of
the state’s intent to waive its immunity.
In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,19 the Court examined
the interplay between  federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) claims and a state HMO Act pro-
viding for independent medical review of a denial of benefits.
The Court held 5-4 that an Illinois statute regulating HMOs by
providing a “right to independent medical review of certain
denials of benefits” is not preempted by ERISA. Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, pointed out that ERISA has two
sweeping “antiphonal clauses” creating conflict: one preempt-
ing any state laws “relating to” employee benefit plans and
another with similarly broad scope that “saves” any state laws
from preemption if they regulate “insurance, banking, or secu-
rities.” Since the challenged statute relates to ERISA plans, it
can be saved only if it regulates HMOs in their capacity as
insurers. The majority began with a commonsense test of the
state statute and found that it is aimed specifically at the insur-
ance industry. The Court then compared this outcome to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s three-factor test. The Court then
noted that a statute may pass both tests and still not survive
preemption if congressional intent is clear. The Court held that
this statute is not preempted because it passes both tests and
“imposes no new obligation or remedy.” Thus, it does not cre-
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ate a conflict between the federal remedies and the states’
power to regulate insurers. Justice Thomas, writing for the four
dissenting justices, would have held that ERISA preempts the
Illinois statute. He pointed out that the “Court has repeatedly
recognized that ERISA’s civil enforcement provision . . . pro-
vides the exclusive vehicle for actions asserting a claim for
benefits under health plans governed by ERISA, and therefore
that state laws that create additional remedies are pre-empted.”
DUE PROCESS – STUDENT PRIVACY
In Gonzaga University v. Doe,20 the Court discussed whether
to infer enforceable rights from a spending statute.  The Court
held in a 5-4 decision that “we have never before held, and
decline to do so here, that spending legislation drafted in terms
resembling those of FERPA [the Federal Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974] can confer enforceable rights.”   The
Court began its analysis by looking at FERPA, which Congress
enacted “to condition the receipt of federal funds on certain
requirements relating to the access and disclosure of student
educational records.”  Next, it looked to past decisions, and
found that spending legislation has rarely given rise to enforce-
able rights.  In those rare instances where enforceable rights
have been found, the Court emphasized that those findings
were based on unmistakable legislative intent: “The key to our
inquiry was that Congress spoke in terms that ‘could not be
clearer,’ and conferred entitlements ‘sufficiently specific and
definite to qualify as enforceable rights.’”  The Court also noted
that its “more recent decisions . . . have rejected attempts to
infer enforceable rights from Spending Clause statutes.”  The
Court explained that in both implied right of action cases as
well as cases under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the first determi-
nation must be whether Congress intended to create a federal
right.  Not only must the statute be phrased in explicit rights-
creating terms, but a plaintiff suing under an implied right of
action must also show that the statute manifests an intent to
create a private remedy as well as a private right.  The Court
recognized that its role in determining whether personal rights
exist in section 1983 suits should not be different from deter-
mining whether personal rights exist in implied right of action
suits.  In both instances, the Court is required to discern
whether Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a
class of beneficiaries.  If the text and structure of the statute
provide no indication of congressional intent to create new
individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit in both sec-
tion 1983 and implied right of action contexts.  FERPA’s
nondisclosure provisions fail to confer enforceable rights.
Ultimately, the Court emphasized that if Congress decides to
create new rights to be enforced by section 1983, “it must do
so in clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no more than
what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable
under an implied private right of action.”  The Court pointed
out that the nondisclosure provisions in FERPA do not contain
“rights-creating language,” have an aggregate focus as opposed
to an individual one, and primarily serve to direct the Secretary
of Education’s distribution of public funds to educational insti-
tutions.  Thus, the Court concluded that no individual rights
have been created that are enforceable under section 1983.
In Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo,21 Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court concluding that
the instructional technique commonly referred to as peer grad-
ing is not an unconstitutional breach of privacy. The respon-
dent brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983
against the school district, its superintendent, and a principal,
alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA).  The decision of the Court
hinges on the determination of whether grades produced by
peer grading are to be considered “educational records” as
FERPA defines them.  The Court of Appeals determined that
grade books and the grades within are “maintained” by the
teacher.  As the Supreme Court summarized the Court of
Appeals opinion, “It reasoned, however, that if Congress for-
bids teachers to disclose students’ grades once written in a
grade book, it makes no sense to permit the disclosure imme-
diately beforehand.”  The Court concluded that the Court of
Appeals’ logic in determining that a teacher’s grade book
“maintains” student records in keeping with the definition of
“educational records” is flawed. The Court cited two statutory
indicators in support of this conclusion.  “First, the student
papers are not, at that stage, ‘maintained’ within the meaning
of” the statute; “[e]ven assuming the teacher’s grade book is an
education record—a point the parties contest and one we do
not decide here—the score on a student-graded assignment is
not ‘contained therein,’. . . until the teacher records it,” the
Court concluded.  Second, the Court did not agree with the
Court of Appeals in the finding that a student grader during an
exercise of peer grading is “a person acting for an educational
institution.”  The Court reasoned, “Just as it does not accord
with our usual understanding to say students are ‘acting for’ an
educational institution when they follow their teacher’s direc-
tion to take a quiz, it is equally awkward to say students are
‘acting for’ an educational institution when they follow their
teacher’s direction to score it.”  Finally, in accordance with
Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,22 the Court examined the
sections of FERPA that include requirements for records of
both requests for access and access to a student’s records.  The
Court concluded, “It is doubtful Congress would have pro-
vided parents with this elaborate procedural machinery to
challenge the accuracy of the grade on every spelling test and
art project the child completes.”  
DUE PROCESS – SUING PRIVATE PRISONS
In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,23 the Court held in
a 5-4 decision that the limited holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Fed. Narcotics Agents24 may not be extended to confer a
right of action for damages against private entities acting under
color of federal law. Respondent suffered a heart attack while
imprisoned under the supervision of the Bureau of Prisons.  He
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filed an action against petitioner, Correctional Services
Corporation, a private company that managed the halfway
house at which he suffered his heart attack.  The Court began
its analysis by discussing its holding in Bivens, which was the
first time the Court had recognized an implied private action
for damages against federal officers who allegedly violated a cit-
izen’s constitutional rights.  The Court in Bivens held that “a
victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers may
bring suit for money damages against the officers in federal
court.”  Respondent’s request that the Bivens holding be
extended to grant a right of action for damages against private
entities acting under color of federal law is a request to “imply
new substantive liabilities,” which the Court refused to do.  The
Court said that its holding in Bivens had only been extended
twice in its history: once in Davis v. Passman,25 where the Court
recognized an implied damages remedy under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and once in Carlson v. Green,26
where the Bivens holding was extended to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  The
Court noted that the circumstances in both of these cases
applied the “core holding in Bivens.”  The circumstances in
Davis dealt with a plaintiff who lacked any other remedy for
constitutional deprivation, while the circumstances in Carlson
dealt with an unsatisfactory alternative.  The Court has refused
to extend Bivens in any situation since its holding in Carlson.
The Court concluded by recognizing the importance of the
available alternative remedies open to the respondent.  
DUE PROCESS – FORFEITURE 
In Dusenbery v. United States,27 petitioner sought to have his
property returned after he was arrested by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.  The FBI was allowed to dispose of the prop-
erty seized pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.  The
statute required the FBI to send written notice of the seizure
with information on the applicable forfeiture proceedings to all
parties who appeared to have in interest in the property.  The
FBI sent letters of intent to forfeit the cash to petitioner by cer-
tified mail in care of the federal prison where petitioner was
incarcerated.  As the FBI received no response to these notices
within the time allotted, the items were declared administra-
tively forfeited.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-
justice majority, held that the use of mail as a method of giving
notice to federal prisoners about the right to contest the
administrative forfeiture of property is constitutional.  The
Court noted that the government has carried its burden of
showing that the procedures used to give notice were ade-
quate.  The FBI’s use of the U.S. Postal Service to send certified
mail to petitioner has been recognized as an adequate measure
when notice by publication is insufficient and an address is
known.  The Court determined that the use of mail addressed
to petitioner at the penitentiary was “clearly acceptable for
much the same reason we have approved mailed notice in the
past.  Short of allowing the prisoner to go to the post office
himself, the remaining portion of the delivery would necessar-
ily depend on a system in effect within the prison relying on
prison staff.  We think the FBI’s use of [this] system . . . was
‘reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise
[petitioner] of the action.’  Due process requires no more.”
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – SEX OFFENDERS
The Court addressed the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act (SVPA) in Kansas v. Crane.28 The Court held that the SVPA
does not require the state to prove an offender’s total or com-
plete lack of control over dangerous behavior.  However, the
Constitution does require a minimum lack-of-control determi-
nation to be made in order for civil commitment to be allowed.
Respondent, Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender
who suffers from exhibitionism and an antisocial personality
disorder, was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior and
pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery for two incidents
that occurred on the same day.  Kansas sought the civil com-
mitment of respondent.  The Court’s analysis discussed the
prior case of Kansas v. Hendricks,29 where the Court held that
the statute’s criteria for confinement of “mental abnormality or
personality disorder” satisfied the substantive due process
requirements.  The Court now finds, however,  that “Hendricks
sets forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control.”
The Court pointed out that the Constitution does not permit
commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender found in
Hendricks “without any lack-of-control determination.”  The
Court admitted that Hendricks provides a constitutional stan-
dard that is not precise.  The Court explained, however, that
“the constitution’s safeguards of human liberty in the area of
mental illness and the law are not always best enforced
through precise bright-line rules.”  Although the Court does
not propose a bright-line rule, it is still able to provide consti-
tutional guidance by “proceeding deliberately and contextu-
ally, elaborating generally stated constitutional standards and
objectives as specific circumstances require. Hendricks embod-
ied that approach.”  The Court, therefore, was able to reconcile
its decision with the decision in Hendricks.  
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – EVICTING TENANTS FOR
DRUG-RELATED ACTIVITIES
In Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,30
the Court held 8-0 that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 law-
fully requires lease terms that allow a local public housing
authority to evict a tenant when members of the tenant’s
household or a guest engages in drug-related criminal activity.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, indicated that
the broad, plain language of the statute precludes any knowl-
edge requirement for evictions based on drug-related offenses.
Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who “cannot control drug
crime, or other criminal activities by a household member
which threaten the health or safety of other residents, is a
threat to other residents and the project.” The Court pointed
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out that due process concerns are not triggered since the gov-
ernment is “acting as a landlord of property it owns, invoking
a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and which
Congress has expressly required,” rather than attempting to
criminally punish or to civilly regulate respondents as mem-
bers of the general populace. 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
In Barnes v. Gorman,31 Justice Scalia, writing for a six-mem-
ber majority, held that punitive damages may not be awarded
in a private cause of action brought under section 202 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.  The Court explained that “the remedies for
violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act are coextensive with the remedies available in a private
cause of action brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination in federally
funded programs and activities.”  The Court explained, “Title
VI invokes Congress’s power under the Spending Clause . . . to
place conditions on the grant of federal funds.”  Moreover, the
Court emphasized that it has “repeatedly characterized this
statute and other Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients]
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.’”
Consequently, “the legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate
under the spending power . . . rests on whether the [recipient]
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”
Applying the contract analogy, the remedy may be considered
“appropriate relief . . . only if the funding recipient is on notice
that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability
of that nature.”  The Court pointed out that “punitive dam-
ages, unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are gener-
ally not available for breach of contract.”  Further, an implied
punitive damages provision cannot be reasonably found in
Title VI, and therefore should not be implied in section 202 of
the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, either.
Justice O’Connor writing for a unanimous Court in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,32 held that in
order to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks
under the ADA, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the performance of activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.  Further,
“[t]he impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long
term.”  The ADA “requires covered entities . . . to provide ‘rea-
sonable accommodations to the known physical or mental lim-
itations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability’
. . . unless . . . the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship.”  A disability is defined in the statute as: “(A) a phys-
ical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”  The Court began its analysis guided by the reg-
ulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
lists examples of “major life activities,”  including “walking,
seeing, hearing,” and “performing manual tasks.” However,
they “do not define the term ‘substantially limits.’”  The Court
then turned to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations that indicate that “‘substan-
tially limited’ means ‘unable to perform a major life activity
that the average person in the general population can per-
form,’” and then lists a number of factors to consider.
Ultimately, the Court relied on the dictionary definition of the
ADA’s terms.  Since “‘substantially’ in the phrase ‘substantially
limits’ suggests ‘considerable’ or ‘to a large degree,’” it “clearly
precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with
the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabili-
ties.”  Also, “‘major’ in the phrase ‘major life activities’ means
important,” and “thus refers to those activities that are of cen-
tral importance to daily life.”  Consequently, “[i]t is insuffi-
cient for individuals attempting to prove disability status
under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagno-
sis of an impairment,” but instead, individuals must offer “evi-
dence that the extent of the limitation caused by their impair-
ment in terms of their own experience is substantial.”
Focusing its attention on carpal tunnel syndrome, the Court
explained that “[w]hile cases of severe carpal tunnel syndrome
are characterized by muscle atrophy and extreme sensory
deficits, mild cases generally do not have either of these effects
and create only intermittent symptoms of numbness and tin-
gling.”  Consequently, “an individual’s carpal tunnel syndrome
diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate whether the individual
has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.”  Finally, the
Court instructed, “[w]hen addressing the major life activity of
performing manual tasks, the central inquiry must be whether
the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to
most people’s daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to
perform the tasks associated with her specific job.”  
In Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal,33 a unanimous Court held
that the ADA allows a company to refuse to hire an individual
on the basis that his performance on the job would endanger
his own health, owing to a disability. The Act prohibits “dis-
crimination against a qualified individual with a disability . . .
by an employer” but also creates an affirmative defense for
refusal to hire because of a “qualification standard” demon-
strated to be “job-related for the position in question.” This
standard may include a requirement that the individual not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety to oneself or others
in the workplace. The direct-threat defense demands a “partic-
ularized inquiry into the harms the employee would probably
face,” based on “reasonable medical judgment . . . and individ-
ualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely
perform the essential functions of the job” after considering
facts such as “the imminence of the risk and the severity of the
harm portended.”
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,34 the Court considered the
interplay between seniority systems and the ADA. The Court
held, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Breyer, that ordinar-
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ily the ADA does not require an employer to assign a disabled
employee to a particular position even though another
employee is entitled to that position under an established
seniority system because such an accommodation is not “rea-
sonable.” An employer who makes a showing that the assign-
ment would violate the rules of a seniority system is entitled to
summary judgment, unless a plaintiff can present evidence
that “special circumstances” in the particular case demonstrate
that the assignment is nonetheless reasonable. The Court
acknowledged that reaching the ADA’s “equal opportunity
goal” will sometimes require “preferential” treatment, so a dif-
ference in treatment that violates an employer’s disability neu-
tral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the
Act’s potential reach. The Court further indicated that giving
the operative words in the Act their ordinary English meanings
supports the Court’s decision.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
The Court considered the requirements for pleading an
employment discrimination lawsuit in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A.,35 where it held that an employment discrimination com-
plaint does not need to include specific facts establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination.  The Court determined that
all that is needed is a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.  Petitioner filed a
lawsuit contending he had been fired on account of his
national origin in violation on the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and on account of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.  The Court noted
that specific requirements of a prima facie case are flexible and
were not intended to be rigid.  Since discovery may reveal rel-
evant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the
required formulation of the prima facie case.  The Court
stressed that “given that the prima facie case operates as a flex-
ible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a
rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases.”  The Court
concluded by pointing out that petitioner’s complaint satisfied
the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and did not need to contain specific facts to do so.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,36 a highly
fractured Court held that while Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 “precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination
or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period,”
courts may consider “the entire scope of a hostile work envi-
ronment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statu-
tory time limit” so long as “any act contributing to that hostile
environment takes place within the statutory time period.”
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, part of which was
joined by only five justices and part of which was joined by all
nine.  Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring and dissenting
opinion that was joined at least in part by four other justices.
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas said that hostile work
environment claims are “different in kind from discrete acts”
since their “very nature involves repeated conduct.” Such
claims focus on the “cumulative affect of the individual acts,”
any one of which “may not be actionable on its own” but “col-
lectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’”
The Court considered the interaction between the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s power to seek victim-specific relief in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.37
There, the Court held 6-3 that an arbitration agreement
between an employer and an employee does not bar the EEOC
from “pursuing victim-specific judicial relief” in enforcement
actions alleging employer violation of Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, explains that while the Federal Arbitration Act mani-
fests a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”
a contract “cannot bind a nonparty” such as the EEOC. EEOC
claims are not “merely derivative” and may be “seeking to vin-
dicate a public interest” even when the relief sought appears to
be “entirely victim-specific.” Thus, drawing a line “between
injunctive and victim-specific relief” to determine what reme-
dies the EEOC may use to vindicate public interests would be
an ineffective way of “preserving the EEOC’s public function
while favoring arbitration.”
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board,38 the Court held in a 5-4 decision that federal
immigration policy embodied in the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) foreclosed the power of the
National Labor Relations Board to award backpay to an
undocumented alien who had never been legally authorized to
work in the United States. Petitioner impermissibly fired four
employees in an effort to rid its business of known union sup-
porters, one of whom was subsequently discovered to be an
illegal alien. While generally broad, the NLRB’s discretion to
select and fashion remedies for employment violations is not
unlimited and may be curtailed by congressionally enacted
federal immigration law policy. The Court said that the IRCA
combats employment of illegal aliens via a verification system
requiring employers to confirm the identity and eligibility of
all new hires by examining specified documents before they
begin work and corresponding criminal sanctions for unau-
thorized aliens who subvert the employer verification system
by tendering fraudulent documents. The Court concluded that
awarding backpay to illegal aliens is beyond the NLRB’s reme-
dial discretion because it is impossible for an undocumented
alien to obtain employment in the United States without some
party directly contravening explicit congressional policies.
Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenting justices, found
the order awarding backpay was lawful since the NLRB’s lim-
ited backpay order reasonably helped to deter unlawful activ-
ity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent. 
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OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS
In a 6-3 decision, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,39 held that two temporary moratoria on land develop-
ment instituted by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) were not per se takings of property requiring compen-
sation under the Takings Clause.  In its effort to develop stan-
dards to protect the Lake Tahoe area from further deteriora-
tion, the TRPA enacted Ordinance 81-5 and later Resolution
83-21, which together “effectively prohibited all construction”
on particular California lands in the Lake Tahoe Basin for 32
months and certain lands in Nevada for eight months.  The
Court explained that its jurisprudence regarding “physical tak-
ings . . . involves the straightforward application of per se
rules,” whereas its “regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is
characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’ designed
to allow ‘careful examination of all the relevant circum-
stances.’”  The Court emphasized that the “longstanding dis-
tinction between acquisitions of property for public use . . .
and regulations prohibiting private uses . . . makes it inappro-
priate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a
‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa.”  The Court noted “two rea-
sons why a regulation temporarily denying an owner all use of
her property might not constitute a taking.”  First, it is within
the state’s authority to enact safety regulations.  Second, there
are “normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like.”  The Court has
previously held that “compensation is required when a regula-
tion deprives an owner of ‘all economically beneficial uses’ of
land.”  However, this “holding was limited to ‘the extraordi-
nary circumstance when no productive or economically bene-
ficial use of land is permitted.”  Consequently, “anything less
than a ‘complete elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss’ . . .
would require” a fact-based analysis.  The Court said that the
temporary nature of the restriction was of great significance:
“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by
a temporary prohibition on economic use because the property
will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”  In
Justice Thomas’s brief dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Scalia, he responded forcefully to this assertion, saying the
majority’s assurance that the loss in value will only be tempo-
rary serves “cold comfort to the property owners in this case or
any other.”  “After all,” he said by quoting John Maynard
Keynes, “‘[i]n the long run we are all dead.’”  
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the Court’s criminal decisions this term, 5-4
splits were prevalent in the Court’s civil decisions.  There were
numerous concurring opinions this year, as justices were less
inclined to join majority opinions in their entirety.  Also, there
were times when the justices departed from the typical conser-
vative and liberal blocs, which seems to suggest that certain
issues could create strange bedfellows.  However, there
remains a ubiquitous concern regarding the future validity of
these numerous ideologically split decisions in the face of the
possible retirement by a few justices.  The alignment that
would result from the potential future appointments would
categorically impact the strengthening or weakening of the
Supreme Court’s decisions during these recent terms.  This
may prove especially true in the federalism area.
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(forthcoming) (objecting to the tendency of committees to follow
the exact language of statutes and court opinions).  
This will not be the first or last article that criticizes thestyle of drafting in federal statutes.  But it will, I believe,be different in at least one respect: it will scrutinize the
style in just one small slice of federal drafting in a way that
should edify drafters of any legal document.  In fact, this
inspection should open the eyes of all legal writers—for I’ll
identify some of the persistent, inexcusable failings that per-
vade all legal writing.  I did this kind of thing once before in
Court Review, using the final orders from the Clinton impeach-
ment trial.1 If you think those impeachment orders were
revealing, wait until you see the USA Patriot Act.2
It’s amazing, really, how much you can wring out of a few
paragraphs.  And I’m not talking about subtle or arguable
points; I’m talking about the kinds of changes that good styl-
ists or editors would make almost routinely.  At the same time,
none of the items that I list below are what you would call
major.  None of them go to the unfriendly format of federal
statutes or their overdivided structure.  Nor do I get into orga-
nization or degree of detail.  Nor do I raise the standard com-
plaint about serpentine sentences full of embedded clauses, or
even mention the passive voice.  Individually, my changes may
seem small, but taken as a whole, their effect is considerable.
And so it is with writing: clarity does not come in one or two
strokes, but through the cumulative effect of many improve-
ments, some of them larger and some smaller.
How did our profession ever arrive at this state of linguistic
distress?  Apparently, 400 years’ worth of legalese has left us
blind.  We are so used to it that we can’t see it for what it is, or
can’t muster the will to resist, or don’t care.  The great irony is
that most lawyers seem to consider themselves quite proficient
at writing and drafting.3 They are deluded.  But as Reed
Dickerson, the father of American drafting, observed, “It is
hard to sell people new clothes if they consider themselves
already well accoutered.”4
Of course, we all realize that legislative drafters work under
pressure, that very often or perhaps most often they do not
have a free hand, that the process is messy and variable, and
that some drafters are no doubt skilled and experienced.  Yet
they are still heirs to “a history of wretched writing.”5 So it’s
not surprising that the habits I criticize have seemingly
become ingrained.
At any rate, let me say a word about the paragraphs I’ll use
from the Patriot Act.  I didn’t scour the Act for the worst exam-
ples.  I didn’t scour the Act at all.  These paragraphs came to
my attention because they affect the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which I have an interest in.  For the last three years,
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules has been restyling
all the criminal rules—a huge undertaking—and I served as a
consultant during the last part of the project.  The restyled
criminal rules were submitted to the Supreme Court last
November.6 At about the same time, Congress passed the
Patriot Act, and the advisory committee had to scramble to
insert conforming language into the new version of the rules.
The Act amended Rules 6(e)(3)(C) and 41(a) of the old rules;
the committee inserted the changes into 6(e)(3)(D) and
41(b)(3) of the new rules.  I’m going to deal only with the Rule
6 changes because the Rule 41 changes were much shorter.  
Now, the committee decided that it had to use the statutory
language in the court rules—an understandable decision but a
serious setback for good drafting.7 It’s disheartening, after the
long effort to improve the rules’ clarity and consistency, to see
that statutory language imported almost verbatim.
And here it is, in all its glory.
THE PARAGRAPHS THAT AFFECT CRIMINAL RULE 6
This is from Title II, section 203(a)(1), of the Patriot Act:
Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is amended to read as follows:
“(C)(i) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of
matters occurring before the grand jury may also be
made—
. . . .
“(V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or
foreign intelligence information (as defined in clause
(iv) of this subparagraph), to any Federal law enforce-
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ment, intelligence, protective, immigration, national
defense, or national security official in order to assist
the official receiving that information in the perfor-
mance of his official duties.
. . . .
“(iii) Any Federal official to whom information is dis-
closed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph
may use that information only as necessary in the con-
duct of that person’s official duties subject to any limita-
tions on the unauthorized disclosure of such informa-
tion.  Within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an
attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice
with the court stating the fact that such information was
disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to
which the disclosure was made.
“(iv) In clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph, the term ‘for-
eign intelligence information’ means—
“(I) information, whether or not concerning a United
States person, that relates to the ability of the United
States to protect against—
“(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hos-
tile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power;
“(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a for-
eign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
“(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intel-
ligence service or network of a foreign power or by
an agent of [a] foreign power; or 
“(II) information, whether or not concerning a United
States person, with respect to a foreign power or for-
eign territory that relates to—
“(aa) the national defense or the security of the
United States; or
“(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the
United States.”
SO WHAT’S THE TROUBLE?
Did those paragraphs seem pretty normal—about par for
legal drafting?  I suspect they did, so let me try to identify some
deficiencies.  After each item, I’ll include one or more exam-
ples, along with a revised version or a question.  
1.  An Aversion to Pronouns
• “acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power”
acts by a foreign power or its agent
• “the national defense or the security of the United
States; or the conduct of the foreign affairs of the
United States” 
. . .  or the conduct of its foreign affairs
2. An Aversion to Possessives
• “clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence
service or network of a foreign power or by an agent
of a foreign power”
clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power’s
intelligence service, intelligence network, or agent
3. An Aversion to -ing Forms (Participles and Gerunds)
• “in the performance of his official duties”
in performing his official duties
• “in the conduct of that person’s official duties”
in conducting [or “to conduct”] that person’s official
duties
4. An Aversion to Hyphens
• “foreign intelligence information”
foreign-intelligence information
• “Federal law enforcement, . . . national defense, or
national security official”  
Federal law-enforcement, . . . national-defense, or
national-security official
5. Overuse of “Such,” “That” (as a Demonstrative Adjective),
and “Any”
• “Any [A] Federal official to whom information is dis-
closed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph
may use that [the] information only as necessary in
the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to
any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of
such [the] information.  Within a reasonable time
after such disclosure, an attorney for the government
shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the
fact that such [the] information was disclosed . . . .”
6. Cumbersome and Unnecessary Cross-References
• “foreign intelligence information (as defined in clause
(iv) of this subparagraph)”
foreign-intelligence information (as defined in
(C)(iv))
• “In clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph, the term ‘for-
eign intelligence information’ means—”
“Foreign-intelligence information” means—  [There’s
no need for the cross-reference, since the earlier 
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provision, where the term was used, already referred
forward to this part.]
7.  A Tendency Toward Syntactic Ambiguity
• “foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as
defined in . . . 50 U.S.C. 401a)” [Does the parentheti-
cal element modify both items?  Yes?]
• “any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protec-
tive, immigration, national defense, or national secu-
rity official” [How many items does Federal modify?
All of them?]
• “activities by an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power” [Does intelligence also modify net-
work?]
8.  General Wordiness
• “in order to assist the official receiving that informa-
tion in the performance of his official duties”
for use in performing the official’s duties
• “Any Federal official to whom information is dis-
closed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph
may use that information only as necessary in the
conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any
limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such
information.”
A federal official who receives information under
(C)(i)(V) [or “receives grand-jury information”] may
use it only as necessary to perform official duties
[and?] subject to any limitations on its unauthorized
disclosure.
`
• “Within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an
attorney for the government shall file under seal a
notice with the court stating the fact that such infor-
mation was disclosed and the departments, agencies,
or entities to which the disclosure was made.” [But
isn’t the disclosure to an official, not an agency?]
Within a reasonable time after disclosure, a govern-
ment attorney must file, under seal, a notice with the
court stating what information was disclosed and to
whom [or “stating what information was disclosed,
the federal official’s name, and the official’s agency”].
9.  General Fuzziness
• “any Federal . . . protective . . . official” [?]
• “a United States person” [?]
10.  Needless Repetition
After (C)(i)(V) requires that the disclosure be to assist
the official in performing official duties, then (C)(iii)
requires that the use be necessary in conducting official
duties.  I kept both requirements in my redraft below, but
I think the first one—concerning the purpose for disclo-
sure—could probably go.  Having to file a notice of the
disclosure makes it unlikely that someone will disclose
for inappropriate reasons.  
(Incidentally, why the switch in these two provisions
from in the performance of (official duties) to in the con-
duct of?  What possible difference is there?  Probably
none, but the switch creates a hint of contextual ambi-
guity.)
A REDRAFT
I’ll leave it to you to decide whether the original or the fol-
lowing redraft is better.  Just two comments: the only part I
reorganized is (C)(iv); and if I inadvertently changed a mean-
ing somewhere, it can easily be restored without reverting to
the style of the original.  All right, then:
Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is amended to read as follows:
(C)(i) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter may also be
made:
. . . .
(V) to a federal official who is engaged in law enforce-
ment, intelligence, protection [?], immigration,
national defense, or national security, if the mat-
ter involves foreign intelligence or counterintelli-
gence (as they are defined in 50 U.S.C. 401a) or
foreign-intelligence information (as defined in
(C)(iv)) and if the information is for use in per-
forming the official’s duties.
. . . .
(iii) A federal official who receives grand-jury informa-
tion may use it only as necessary to perform [his or
her?] official duties and subject to any limitations
on its unauthorized disclosure.  Within a reason-
able time after disclosure, a government attorney
must file, under seal, a notice with the court stat-
ing what information was disclosed and to whom.
(iv) “Foreign-intelligence information” means any
information about a person, a foreign power, or a
foreign territory that relates to the national defense
or the security of the United States, or to the con-
duct of its foreign affairs.  The term includes any
information about:
(I) the ability of the United States to protect
against actual attack, potential attack, sabo-
tage, international terrorism, or other grave
hostile act by a foreign power or its agent; or
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(II) clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign
power’s intelligence service, intelligence net-
work, or agent.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers draft poorly.  And for that to change, several related
things must happen.
First, their loyal critics must keep complaining, keep agitat-
ing; I’ll do my best, as a public service.
Second, reformers must keep exposing the myths about
writing clearly, in plain language—like the myth that plain lan-
guage is not precise, or is just about simple words and short
sentences, or is not supported by any hard evidence of its effec-
tiveness.8
Third, to overcome resistance and doubt, reformers must
keep pointing to major advancements—like the restyled
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, new article 9 of the UCC, and some of the
work done by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
late 1990s.9 The drafting in these projects may not be perfect,
but compare it with what went before.
Fourth, lawyers must stop making excuses for traditional
legal style and stop aping old models.  This will require, to
begin with, some humility and open-mindedness, and then a
close encounter with some books on legal writing or a CLE
course or a good editor.  Like any skill, writing well takes sus-
tained effort; it’s not innate.
Finally, law schools must end their shameful neglect of legal
drafting.  Although many schools have strengthened their writ-
ing programs in the last decade, those programs concentrate
mainly on briefs and memos, not on drafting (contracts, wills,
bylaws, statutes, rules).  True, most schools do offer an elective
in legal drafting, but only a very small number—maybe 10 or
15 schools—require it as a substantial part of their writing pro-
grams.10 It’s no wonder, then, that most lawyers, steeped as
they are in old forms and models, consider themselves good
drafters.  Nobody has ever showed them a better way.
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INFORMATION ON 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
A brief overview of problem-solving courts
is found in the opening essay of this issue
of Court Review.  For those who would like
to look further, here are some additional
resources.
PAMELA CASEY & WILLIAM E. HEWITT,
COURT RESPONSES TO INDIVIDUALS IN NEED
OF SERVICES: PROMISING COMPONENTS OF A
SERVICE COORDINATION STRATEGY FOR
COURTS.  National Center for State Courts,
2001 ($5 shipping & handling).  66 pp.
Researchers Pamela Casey and William
Hewitt review the increased use of
problem-solving courts from several
helpful perspectives.  First, they
describe the primary examples of 
problem-solving courts—community
courts, domestic violence courts, drug
courts, family courts, and mental
health courts, including the types of
service referrals (e.g., drug therapy,
parent education, housing assistance,
etc.) that may arise in each type of
court.  Second, they discuss how court
supervision of the provision of such
services may fit into the role of a judge
and court.  Casey and Hewitt review
the standards of the Trial Court
Performance Standards—access to jus-
tice; expedition and timeliness; equal-
ity, fairness, and integrity; indepen-
dence and accountability; and public
trust and confidence—from the per-
spective of a problem-solving court.
Third, they present nine “promising
components” of an effective strategy
for coordinating services provided
through a problem-solving court.
Their suggestions are based on tele-
phone interviews with court personnel
in 50 jurisdictions and in-depth field
research in eight jurisdictions.
Suggestions include having case-level
service coordinators, judicial and court
leadership, and an active policy com-
mittee of those who have a stake in the
process.  (Copies can be ordered for $5
shipping and handling from Lynn
Grimes, (757) 259-1812, lgrimes@
ncsc.dni.us.)
GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS: A BRIEF PRIMER.
http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
prob_solv_courts.pdf
These authors from New York’s Center
for Court Innovation provide a helpful
overview of the concept of problem-
solving courts and how that concept is
playing out in practice.  Their essay pro-
vides an overview of the development of
problem-solving courts and the reasons
for their recent rise, some definitions of
how they have become unique in prac-
tice, the results of evaluations of their
performance, and a summary of poten-
tial areas of tension between these
courts and some traditional principles of
the justice system.  This online mono-
graph was originally published as an
article in Law and Policy. 
National Center for State Courts Website
Materials on Problem-Solving Courts
http : / /www.ncsconl ine .org/WCDS/
index.htm
From this page on the NCSC website
(which you get to by clicking the
“Court Information” icon on their
home page), look at the folder marked,
“Court System Structure and
Governance.”  There, you’ll find sepa-
rate folders containing articles and
resource materials on specialized and
problem-solving courts.  
U.S. Department of Justice Website
Materials on Problem-Solving Courts
h t tp : / /www.o jp .usdo j . gov / cour t s /
problem_solving.htm
From this page on the Justice
Department’s website, you’ll find fed-
eral reports on drug courts, mental
health courts, community courts, and
teen courts.
Center for Court Innovation
http://www.courtinnovation.org/ 
http://www.problem-solvingcourts.org/
We’ve given you two web addresses
here.  The first is the home page for New
York’s Center for Court Innovation.  The
second is the Center’s specific page con-
taining resources related to problem-
solving courts.  Several publications are
included here, including the Berman &
Feinblatt article mentioned above and
an online monograph describing the
Midtown Community Court in
Manhattan, New York.
Center for Problem-Solving Courts
http://www.problemsolvingcourts.com/
This group attempts to provide
resources, including education and
training, to help problem-solving
courts to succeed.  Its website includes
background briefing papers from a
variety of sources.
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NEW BOOKS
ANN L. KEITH & CAROL R. FLANGO,
EXPEDITING DEPENDENCY APPEALS:
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE DELAY.  National
Center for State Courts, 2002 ($5 shipping
& handling). 70 pp. 
Timeliness is a goal in the resolution of
all court disputes, but it is especially
important when the issues involve chil-
dren.  It becomes critical when the chil-
dren may be forced to remain in unsta-
ble, violent, or otherwise harmful situa-
tions.  Researchers Ann Keith and Carol
Flango surveyed 43 states that have
some procedure in place for expediting
appeals in cases involving dependency
findings (e.g., child in need of care, fos-
ter care, adoption, and abuse cases) and
made an in-depth study of the practices
of several courts.  Their findings con-
tain several major recommendations for
strategies that can streamline the appeal
process.  (Copies can be ordered for $5
shipping and handling from Toni Knorr,
(757) 259-15912, tknorr@ncsc.dni.us.)
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